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I. INTRODUCTION
Health insurance coverage matters to everyone.  It particularly
matters to employees, who view employer-sponsored health care in-
surance as their most important employee benefit.1  For persons who
are not eligible for Medicare, 61% of individuals with health insurance
obtain their coverage through a group health plan that is either par-
tially or fully insured by an employer rather than by an insurance
company.2  These so-called “self-insured” plans universally contain a
provision, known as a reimbursement clause, that requires a plan par-
ticipant to repay medical expenses paid by the plan that are later re-
covered by the participant from a third party as damages in a personal
injury action.  The plan document language at issue in Montanile v.
Board of Trustees,3 the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision involving en-
forcement of a reimbursement clause, is typical:
Amounts that have been recovered by a [participant] from another party are
assets of the Plan . . . and are not distributable to any person or entity without
the Plan’s written release of its subrogation interest. . . . ‘[A]ny amounts’ that
a participant ‘recover[s] from another party by award, judgment, settlement
or otherwise . . .  will promptly be applied first to reimburse the Plan in full for
benefits advanced by the Plan . . . and without reduction for attorneys’ fees,
costs, expenses or damages claimed by the covered person.’4
1. Paul Fronstin & Ruth Helman, Views on the Value of Voluntary Workplace Bene-
fits: Findings from the 2013 Health and Voluntary Workplace Benefits Survey, 34
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 14, 14 (Nov. 2013),  https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/
EBRI_Notes_11_Nov-13_LSDs-WBS.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/X362-WMMZ]
(“With the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(PPACA), employees overwhelmingly consider health insurance to be the most
important workplace benefit.”).
2. See Section Ten: Plan Funding, 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2016-section-
nine-section-ten-plan-funding/ [https://perma.unl.edu/3JTF-DV38].
3. 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016).
4. Id. at 655.
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By enforcing such a reimbursement clause, the plan is able to recover
amounts expended for what are usually very large medical bills,
thereby helping to keep the cost of coverage under the plan more af-
fordable for the plan’s sponsoring employer.5
Part II of the Article explains the civil enforcement system for plan
reimbursement clauses under the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 19746 (ERISA), the federal law that exclusively governs
reimbursement claims brought by group health plans that are spon-
sored by private industry employers.7  Attempts by ERISA plan ad-
ministrators to enforce plan reimbursement clauses (known as
“ERISA subrogation claims”) have resulted in no less than four United
States Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Great-West Life &
Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson in 2002,8 and ending most recently
with Montanile v. Board of Trustees.9  Part III of the Article analyzes
the enforcement problems created by these Supreme Court decisions
for injured plan participants, the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar, plan
administrators, and the state and federal courts. The Article’s first
claim, presented and developed in Part III, is that all of the players
who are involved in ERISA subrogation claim litigation are ill-served
by the current enforcement system.  Injured plan participants are dis-
couraged from pursuing legitimate damages claims against
tortfeasors because the net recovery—after first fully reimbursing the
victim’s health care plan—may be so minimal that filing a personal
injury action is futile.10  The plaintiffs’ personal injury bar is discour-
aged from providing legal representation to tort victims whose health
insurance coverage is provided through an employer’s self-insured
plan because today’s well-drafted plan document will require that the
plan must be reimbursed first out of any recovery, in full, for all medi-
cal expenses paid by the plan that resulted from the tortfeasor’s con-
duct, without sharing in the litigation costs expended to achieve the
5. See sources cited infra note 230.
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
ERISA].
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2012) (defining the scope of ERISA coverage).  To simplify
the presentation, the Article uses a single private employer who sponsors a single
employer plan for its own employees as the governing paradigm for discussion
purposes. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(41) (2012) (defining single employer plan).  Reim-
bursement claims brought by multiemployer plans, which are jointly sponsored
by employers and labor unions for collective bargaining unit employees, also are
exclusively governed by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (2012) (defining mul-
tiemployer plan); id. § 1003 (defining scope of ERISA coverage); id.
§ 1132(a)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (describing civil actions).  The enforcement problems and
related legal analysis described in the Article are the same for both single em-
ployer and multiemployer plan reimbursement claims.
8. See discussion infra subsection II.B.1.
9. See discussion infra subsection II.B.4.
10. See discussion infra subsections II.B.3 & III.A.1.
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successful monetary recovery.11  Under current Supreme Court prece-
dent, these plan terms (which may seem inequitable) are enforceable
as “appropriate equitable relief” against the plan participant under
section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.12  As a result, the fund recovered from the
tortfeasor—either through a pretrial settlement or a jury award—may
not even be sufficient to pay the contingency fee earned by the plain-
tiff-participant’s tort attorney, let alone make the participant whole
for her injuries.13
As frustrating as ERISA subrogation claims may be for injured
plan participants and the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar, the legal lab-
yrinth that plan administrators must navigate to enforce a plan reim-
bursement clause is equally frustrating.  The current civil
enforcement system presents numerous practical and procedural ob-
stacles to efficient enforcement.14  The required monitoring of per-
sonal injury claims brought by plan participants against third parties,
coupled with uncertain and cumbersome litigation in the federal
courts, increase the administrative costs to the employer of sponsoring
the health care plan for its employees.15  For the plan’s administrator,
these enforcement actions are not optional.  Rather, vigilance is man-
dated by ERISA’s fiduciary duty standards, which require the plan
administrator to act in the best interests of all of the plan’s partici-
pants and to prudently administer the plan document according to its
terms, including a plan reimbursement clause.16
Finally, the current enforcement system for ERISA subrogation
claims results in the unnecessary waste of state and federal judicial
resources.17  Under ERISA, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
11. See discussion infra section II.C.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
13. See discussion infra subsections II.B.3 & III.A.1.
14. See discussion infra section III.B.
15. An employer self-insured group health plan operates differently than an insured
group health plan, where the insurance company bears the cost of bringing analo-
gous subrogation claims under state insurance laws. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) (saving state laws regulating insurance from preemption).  For an
employer self-insured plan, the employer bears the administrative costs of the
plan, including any costs associated with enforcing a plan reimbursement clause.
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A), (B), (D).  This fiduciary duty to administer the plan
in accordance with its terms, including the terms of a reimbursement clause that
prohibits application of the common-fund doctrine, is limited to the extent that
the terms of the plan are “consistent with the [terms of the fiduciary responsibil-
ity provisions of subchapter 4 of title I of ERISA].”  29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(D).  We
discuss in subsection III.A.2 of the Article the possibility that a plan administra-
tor may have a fiduciary duty to disregard the terms of the plan’s reimbursement
clause if negotiating a fee-sharing arrangement with the injured participant’s
tort attorney is likely to result in a net recovery of plan assets that is in the best
interests of the plan’s participants. See discussion infra text notes 143–51 and
accompanying text.
17. See discussion infra subsections II.B.2–4.
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tion over a plan administrator’s claim to enforce a reimbursement
clause.18  As a result, it is impossible to adjudicate an ERISA subroga-
tion claim together with what (in the absence of diversity subject mat-
ter jurisdiction)19 is usually a state court tort action.  The result is
bifurcated litigation, with the plan participant’s personal injury claim
typically being litigated in state court, and the ERISA subrogation
claim to enforce the plan’s reimbursement clause against the partici-
pant being litigated in federal court.
The Article’s second claim, presented in Part IV, is that Congress
can resolve these myriad problems through a targeted statutory
amendment to ERISA’s civil claims and remedies provisions.  Such an
amendment would reject the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in US
Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen20 by requiring application of the equity-
based common-fund doctrine to ERISA subrogation claims and ren-
dering void as a matter of public policy plan terms to the contrary.
The result would be to incentivize personal injury actions by plan par-
ticipants and to more fairly allocate litigation costs between the in-
jured plan participant and the plan.  In return, the proposed
amendment would reduce the administrative costs of enforcement for
employers by giving state courts concurrent jurisdiction over ERISA
subrogation claims and prohibiting removal of ERISA subrogation
claims to the federal courts so that such claims could be adjudicated in
a single state court forum together with the participant’s underlying
tort claim.  The impact would be to significantly streamline and sim-
plify the enforcement procedure for reimbursement clauses.
Section IV.C of the Article analyzes the policy implications of the
proposed statutory amendment.  We contend that the many policy
benefits of changing the status quo far outweigh the policy objection
that a change would undermine ERISA’s goal of providing for national
uniformity through exclusive federal court subject matter jurisdiction
over ERISA subrogation claims.  The Article concludes by urging Con-
gress to act in a bipartisan fashion to resolve the problems with ER-
ISA subrogation claims described in Part III of the Article.  In light of
Congress’s failed attempt to repeal the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act21 (Affordable Care Act or ACA), the need for reform in
this highly technical area of the law has become more pressing.  Not-
withstanding the ACA’s employer mandate to provide health care in-
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
20. See discussion infra subsection II.B.3.
21. See Mike DeBonis, Ed O’Keefe and Robert Costa, GOP Health-Care Bill: House
Republican Leaders Abruptly Pull Their Rewrite of the Nation’s Health-Care Law,
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-
leaders-prepare-to-vote-friday-on-health-care-reform/2017/03/24/736f1cd6-1081-
11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html?utm_term=.3676254df9ea [https://
perma.unl.edu/WJ55-Q54R].
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surance,22 an employer’s decision to offer coverage under a group
health plan remains a voluntary decision.  Given the voluntary nature
of employment-based group health plans, national health care policy
should seek to minimize the costs to employers of sponsoring and ad-
ministering group health plans for their workers.  The targeted statu-
tory amendment proposed by the Article is a modest step towards
achieving this important public policy objective.
II. ERISA SUBROGATION CLAIMS
The starting point for understanding the legal and practical
problems with ERISA subrogation claims is the extent to which ER-
ISA preempts state laws that typically would govern subrogation liti-
gation.  As a general rule, section 514(a) of ERISA preempts all state
laws that “relate to” an employee benefit plan.23  Although state in-
surance laws as applied to insured group health plans are saved from
ERISA’s general preemption provision,24 it has long been the law that
employer-sponsored self-insured plans are not subject to state insur-
ance law requirements, which include laws that regulate an insurer’s
subrogation rights against an insured.25  Thus, the federal law of ER-
ISA exclusively controls the enforcement of plan reimbursement
clauses found in self-insured group health plans.26
This principle of ERISA preemption originally was established by
the Supreme Court in FMC Corp. v. Holliday,27 which involved an at-
tempt by a self-insured group health plan to enforce the terms of a
reimbursement clause.  In FMC Corp., the plan participant was se-
verely injured in an automobile accident and the plan paid for her
medical expenses.28  The participant brought a negligence claim
against the driver of her automobile in Pennsylvania state court,
22. See 26 U.S.C. § 4890H(a)–(b) (imposing a tax penalty on employers having fifty or
more full-time equivalent employees who fail to offer minimum essential health
insurance coverage that is affordable for employees).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
24. See § 1144(b)(2)(A) (savings clause); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 746–47 (1985).
25. See § 1144(b)(2)(B) (deemer clause); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61
(1990).
26. Although self-insured plans are regulated exclusively by ERISA, employers who
desire to control for the risk of catastrophic health care claims can purchase stop-
loss insurance, which “insures the plan against claims above a certain dollar
amount” (known as the attachment point). See Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its
Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health
Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 492 (1998).  The existence of stop-loss insur-
ance, even at very low-dollar attachment points, does not transform a self-in-
sured plan into an insured plan that is subject to regulation under state
insurance laws. See id. at 492–93.
27. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
28. Id. at 55.
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which the parties settled.  While the negligence action was pending,
the employer, acting as the plan’s administrator, notified the partici-
pant that it would seek reimbursement for the medical expenses paid
by the plan.29  The participant countered that a Pennsylvania state
insurance law barred the plan’s ERISA subrogation claim.30  The Su-
preme Court disagreed, holding that the Pennsylvania anti-subroga-
tion law, as applied to an employer’s self-insured plan, was
preempted.31
Section 502(a) of ERISA lists the types of civil actions permitted
under the statute and specifies the remedies available for each partic-
ular type of claim.32  Subsection 502(a)(3) authorizes a plan fiduciary
to bring a civil action “(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates
any provision of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.”33  As ER-
ISA’s “catch-all” claims provision,34 section 502(a)(3) has been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court as authorizing a claim by a plan
administrator against a plan participant to enforce the terms of a re-
imbursement clause.35  Importantly, section 502(e)(1) of ERISA gives
the federal district courts exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
claims brought under section 502(a)(3).36  It is the exclusive nature of
federal court subject matter jurisdiction over ERISA subrogation
29. Id.
30. See id. at 52–55.  The Pennsylvania state law at issue, section 1720 of the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1720 (1987), provided
in relevant part that:
‘in actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there
shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort
recovery with respect to. . .benefits. . .payable under section 1719.’  Sec-
tion 1719 refers to benefit payments by ‘[a]ny program, group contract or
other arrangement.’
FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 55.
31. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 65.  With respect to an insured plan, the federal courts of
appeals are divided concerning whether ERISA completely preempts a partici-
pant’s claim, based on a state anti-subrogation law, that seeks to invalidate the
terms of an insured plan requiring reimbursement of medical expenses paid by
the plan. See Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., 761 F.3d 232, 243–44 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1400 (2015) (discussing the circuit split between the Second
Circuit and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits).  Due to the Supreme Court’s
squarely on point decision in FMC Corp., no such division among the federal
courts of appeals exists with respect to the enforcement of reimbursement clause
terms in self-insured plans.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
34. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511–12 (1996).
35. See discussion infra subsection II.B.2.
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
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claims that is the fundamental source of the problems with reimburse-
ment clause litigation.37
A. The Fiduciary Duties of Plan Administrators
All ERISA fiduciaries, including plan administrators,38 are subject
to the fiduciary responsibility provisions set forth in part 4 of title I of
ERISA.39  These provisions reflect two underlying policy objectives.
ERISA’s primary policy objective is to protect the rights of plan par-
ticipants and their promised plan benefits (the “protective policy”).40
ERISA’s secondary policy objective is to avoid discouraging employers
from voluntarily sponsoring benefit plans for their workers by mini-
mizing the administrative burdens and related costs associated with
plan sponsorship (the “cost control policy”).41
In crafting ERISA, Congress attempted to strike a balance between
these two policy goals, which often are in tension when plan partici-
pants desire more or better benefits but employers are reluctant to
shoulder the additional costs.42  In the reimbursement clause context,
however, these policy objectives should—at least in theory—align
rather than compete.  If an injured plan participant can recoup funds
from a third-party tortfeasor as reimbursement for medical expenses
paid by the plan, then the pool of plan assets available to pay other
participant claims for health care benefits is increased, and the em-
ployer’s financial obligation to fund those benefits is, either directly or
indirectly, reduced.43
Under ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility provisions, a fiduciary
must “discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and de-
37. See discussion infra section III.B.
38. Plan administrators are by definition ERISA fiduciaries. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(16), (21)(A) (2012).
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–13 (2012).
40. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996); Mertens v. Hewitt As-
socs., 508 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1993).
41. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504, 515 (1981) (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148
n.17 (1985))).
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1–2 (1973) (“The primary purpose of the bill is the
protection of individual pension rights, but the committee has been constrained
to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans.  The relative im-
provements required by this Act have been weighted against the additional bur-
dens to be placed on the system.  While modest cost increases are to be
anticipated when the Act becomes effective, the adverse impact of these increases
have been minimized.”).
43. See Roger M. Baron & Anthony P. Lamb, The Revictimization of Personal Injury
Victims by ERISA Subrogation Claims, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 325, 333 & nn.48 &
50 (2012).
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fraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”44  This re-
quirement is known as the exclusive benefit rule or the duty of loyalty.
In addition, a plan administrator is required to discharge his duties
with respect to the plan “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in
a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the con-
duct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”45  This
requirement is known as the duty of prudence.  Finally, ERISA re-
quires that a plan administrator must discharge his duties with re-
spect to a plan “in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with the provisions of [ERISA].”46  This requirement,
known as the duty to follow plan terms, as a general rule includes
enforcement of a plan reimbursement clause.47
B. Reimbursement Claims Against Plan Participants
Reimbursement claims must be brought in federal district court
under section 502(a)(3) as claims for “appropriate equitable relief.”48
The nature of “appropriate equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3)
was first defined by the Supreme Court in Mertens v. Hewitt and Asso-
ciates.49  In Mertens, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended
“appropriate equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3) to be limited to
“categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as
injunction, mandamus, and restitution), but not compensatory dam-
ages.”50 Mertens did not involve a reimbursement clause claim, but
rather was a claim for damages against a nonfiduciary defendant for
participating in a fiduciary’s breach of duty under ERISA.51  Nine
years after Mertens was decided, the Supreme Court had its first op-
portunity to interpret the meaning of “appropriate equitable relief” in
the context of a claim for reimbursement in Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. v. Knudson.52
44. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
45. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
46. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
47. Exceptions to enforcement may apply. See discussion infra subsection III.A.2.
48. 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) (2012). See generally John H. Langbein, What ERISA
Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens,
and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003); Colleen E. Medill, Resolving
the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 827 (2006).
49. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
50. Id. at 256.
51. Id. at 249.
52. 534 U.S. 204, 210–11 (2002).
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1. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
In Great-West, the primary defendant was a plan beneficiary, Ja-
nette Knudson, who had health insurance coverage through a self-in-
sured plan sponsored by her husband’s employer.  Knudson suffered a
catastrophic injury in an automobile accident that rendered her a
quadriplegic.53  Knudson had $411,157.11 in medical expenses, with
the plan’s stop-loss insurance carrier, Great-West Life and Annuity
Insurance Co. (Great-West), paying for all but the first $75,000 of
Knudson’s medical claims.  The plan assigned to Great-West the right
to enforce the plan’s reimbursement clause.54
Knudson’s attorneys brought various tort claims against the auto-
mobile manufacturer and other tortfeasors involved in the accident in
California state court.55  The parties eventually negotiated a settle-
ment of $650,000.  To preserve Knudson’s eligibility for Medicaid
under California law, the proposed settlement allocated the funds as
follows: $256,745.30 paid directly to the trustee of a special needs
trust set up to pay for Knudson’s medical and other needs that would
not be covered by Medicaid in the future; $5,000 to reimburse the Cali-
fornia Medicaid program; $373,426 for attorneys’ fees; and $13,828.70
to reimburse the plan for Knudson’s medical expenses.56  Notice of
this proposed settlement was mailed to Great-West.57
One day before the scheduled hearing in state court to approve the
negotiated settlement, Great-West filed two actions in federal district
court.58  First, Great-West attempted to remove the case to federal
court.  The federal district court determined that removal was im-
proper and remanded the case back to the state district court, which
then approved the proposed settlement.59  Second, Great-West filed
its own claim in federal district court under section 502(a)(3), seeking
a declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief to enforce the
terms of the plan’s reimbursement clause against Knudson.60
The Supreme Court described the terms of the plan’s reimburse-
ment clause as follows:
The Plan includes a reimbursement provision that is the basis for the present
lawsuit.  This provides that the Plan shall have the right to recover from the
[beneficiary] any payment for benefits” paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is
entitled to recover from a third party.  Specifically, the Plan has “a first lien
upon any recovery, whether by settlement, judgment or otherwise,” that the
beneficiary receives from the third party, not to exceed “the amount of benefits
53. Id. at 207.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 207–08.
57. Id. at 207.
58. Id. at 208.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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paid [by the Plan] . . . [or] the amount received by the [beneficiary] for such
medical treatment . . . .”  If the beneficiary recovers from a third party and
fails to reimburse the Plan, “then he will be personally liable to [the
Plan] . . . up to the amount of the first lien.”61
Pursuant to the terms of the reimbursement clause, Great-West
sought to collect the entire $411,157.11 in medical expenses paid out
of the $650,000 settlement.62  In addition, Great-West filed an
amended complaint seeking a temporary restraining order to enjoin
the settlement approval proceedings in the state trial court.63  The
federal district court denied the temporary restraining order, and the
state trial court approved the settlement agreement.64  Great-West at-
tempted to amend its federal court complaint to add the trustee of the
special needs trust and Knudson’s attorney, who held $256,745.30 and
$373,426, respectively, of the distributed settlement funds, as defend-
ants in pursuing its claim for reimbursement.65  The federal district
court denied the motion to amend the complaint, and the plan did not
appeal the denial of this motion.66  After the state court settlement
was approved, the federal district court granted summary judgment to
Knudson on Great-West’s claim to enforce the reimbursement
clause.67  Rather than awarding $411,157.11 in medical expenses, the
federal district court held that the recovery under the reimbursement
clause was limited to past medical treatment, which the state trial
court had determined to be $13,828.70.68  The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the grant of summary judgment in favor of Knudson, but on different
grounds, holding that a judicial order of reimbursement was not “equi-
table relief” under section 502(a)(3).69
The issue before the Supreme Court in Great-West was whether
the remedy sought by the plan—essentially seeking specific perform-
ance of the contractual obligation to reimburse the plan—could prop-
erly be characterized as “appropriate equitable relief” under section
502(a)(3).70  Relying on its prior interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage in Mertens, the five-Justice majority in Great-West reasoned as
follows:
As we explained in Mertens, “[e]quitable relief must mean something less than
all relief.”  Thus, in Mertens we rejected a reading of the statute that would
extend the relief obtainable under 502(a)(3) to whatever relief a court of eq-
uity is empowered to provide in the particular case at issue (which could in-
61. Id. at 207 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 208.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 207–08, 220.
66. Id. at 220.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 208–09.
69. Id. at 209.
70. Id. at 210.
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clude legal remedies that would otherwise be beyond the scope of the equity
court’s authority).  Such a reading, we said, would “limit the relief not at all”
and render the modifier [‘equitable’] superfluous.  Instead, we held that the
term “equitable relief” in 502(a)(3) must refer to “those categories of relief that
were typically available in equity . . . .”
Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose personal liability on respondents
for a contractual obligation to pay money—relief that was not typically availa-
ble in equity.  “A claim for money due and owing under a contract is ‘quintes-
sentially an action at law.’”  “Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by
judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of
money to the plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has tradi-
tionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss re-
sulting from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.”  And “ ‘[m]oney damages
are, of course, the classic form of the classic form of legal relief.’ ”71
The majority in Great-West also rejected the plan’s argument that
the remedy sought should be characterized as “equitable” restitution:
[N]ot all relief falling under the rubric of restitution is available in equity.  In
the days of the divided bench, restitution was available in certain cases at
law, and in certain others in equity . . . [A] plaintiff could seek restitution in
equity, ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien,
where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the
plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defen-
dant’s possession.  A court of equity could then order a defendant to transfer
title (in the case of the constructive trust) or to give a security interest (in the
case of the equitable lien) to a plaintiff who was, in the eyes of equity, the true
owner.  But where “the property [sought to be recovered] or its proceeds have
been dissipated so that no product remains, [the plaintiff’s] claim is only that
of a general creditor,” and the plaintiff “cannot enforce a constructive trust of
or an equitable lien upon other property of the [defendant].”  Thus, for restitu-
tion to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to impose personal
liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or
property in the defendant’s possession.72
These two passages from Great-West raised numerous questions
that the Supreme Court later answered in Sereboff,73 McCutchen,74
and Montanile.75  In terms of establishing precedent, Great-West
made clear that the terms of a reimbursement clause that purported
to impose a contractual obligation to reimburse the plan would not be
enforced as a personal liability payable from the participant’s general
assets.  In short, Great-West established the principle that “appropri-
ate equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3) to enforce a reimburse-
ment clause excluded monetary damages against a breaching
participant, and further excluded litigation tactics that would accom-
plish the same result as a monetary damages award, such as seeking
71. Id. at 210 (citations and emphasis omitted).
72. Id. at 212–14 (citations omitted).
73. See discussion infra subsection II.B.2.
74. See discussion infra subsection II.B.3.
75. See discussion infra subsection II.B.4.
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an injunction or an order of mandamus to compel the payment of
money to the plan out of the participant’s general assets.76
2. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.
Unlike Great-West, Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services,
Inc.77 involved a more typical situation where the plaintiffs-partici-
pants personally received the bulk of the funds resulting from their
state court tort action.  The plan’s participants, Marlene and Joel Ser-
eboff, were injured in a car accident in California.  Their employer
self-insured health care plan paid for their medical expenses of
$74,869.37.  The Sereboffs filed a personal injury claim in state court,
eventually recovering a settlement of $750,000.  Shortly after the per-
sonal injury action commenced, and on several occasions over the next
two years while the tort litigation was progressing, the plan sent the
Sereboffs and their attorney letters asserting a lien on the anticipated
proceeds from the lawsuit for the medical expenses paid by the plan.
When the lawsuit settled, neither the Sereboffs nor their attorney sent
any money to the plan as reimbursement for the medical expenses.78
The plan sued the Sereboffs and their attorney in federal district
court, bringing a claim under section 502(a)(3) to compel reimburse-
ment for the medical expenses paid by the plan.  As described by the
Supreme Court, the plan’s reimbursement clause provided as follows:
The plan provides for payment of certain covered medical expenses and con-
tains an “Acts of Third Parties” provision.  This provision “applies when [a
beneficiary is] sick or injured as a result of the act or omission of another
person or party,” and requires a beneficiary who “receives benefits” under the
plan for such injuries to “reimburse [Mid Atlantic]” for those benefits from
“[a]ll recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or other-
wise).”  The provision states that “[Mid Atlantic’s] share of the recovery will
not be reduced because [the beneficiary] has not received the full damages
claimed, unless [Mid Atlantic] agrees in writing to a reduction.”79
Unlike the situation in Great-West, and notwithstanding repeated
letters from the plan, the tort settlement proceeds in Sereboff were
distributed before the plan filed its claim in federal court to enforce
the reimbursement clause.  The plan requested a temporary re-
straining order and preliminary injunction requiring the Sereboffs to
set aside and preserve $74,869.37 of the distributed settlement pro-
ceeds.  The parties agreed that the Sereboffs would segregate the
funds in an investment account pending a ruling on the merits of the
plan’s ERISA subrogation claim in federal court and the exhaustion of
all appeals.80
76. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210–11.
77. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
78. Id. at 360.
79. Id. at 359 (citations omitted).
80. See id. at 360.
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The federal district court eventually ruled in the plan’s favor and
ordered the Sereboffs to reimburse the plan.  The Sereboffs appealed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the
federal courts of appeals regarding the enforceability of reimburse-
ment clause claims as “appropriate equitable relief” under section
502(a)(3).81
After first reviewing and reaffirming its earlier holdings in Mer-
tens and Great-West, the Supreme Court distinguished the situation in
Sereboff:
[I]n this case Mid Atlantic sought “specifically identifiable” funds that were
“within the possession and control of the Sereboffs”—that portion of the tort
settlement due Mid Atlantic under the terms of the ERISA plan, set aside and
“preserved [in the Sereboffs’] investment accounts.”  Unlike Great-West, Mid
Atlantic did not simply seek “to impose personal liability . . . for a contractual
obligation to pay money.”  It alleged breach of contract and sought money, to
be sure, but it sought its recovery through a constructive trust or equitable
lien on a specifically identified fund, not from the Sereboffs’ assets generally,
as would be the case with a contract action at law.  ERISA provides for equita-
ble remedies to enforce plan terms, so the fact that the action involves a breach
of contract can hardly be enough to prove relief is not equitable; that would
make § 502(a)(3)(B)(ii) an empty promise.  This Court in Knudson did not re-
ject Great-West’s suit out of hand because it alleged a breach of contract and
sought money, but because Great-West did not seek to recover a particular
fund from the defendant.  Mid Atlantic does.82
In an unexpected twist, the Sereboff Court then turned to a 1914
Supreme Court decision involving a dispute over a contingency fee
among three attorneys to establish that a claim to enforce a contrac-
tual promise as an equitable lien was a form of  “equitable” relief.83  In
Barnes v. Alexander,84 two attorneys named Street and Alexander
performed legal work for a third attorney, Barnes, who promised to
give them a one-third share of the contingency fee he expected to re-
ceive from the case.85  When Barnes later refused to pay over the one-
third share, they successfully sued in equity to enforce the promise as
an equitable lien on the settlement proceeds once the money came into
the possession of Barnes.86  Reasoning by analogy to the situation in
Barnes v. Alexander, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he “Acts of Third Parties” provision in the Sereboffs’ plan specifically iden-
tified a particular fund, distinct from the Sereboffs’ general assets—“[a]ll re-
coveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise)”—
and a particular share of that fund to which Mid Atlantic was entitled—“that
portion of the total recovery which is due [Mid Atlantic] for benefits paid.”
Like Street and Alexander in Barnes, therefore, Mid Atlantic could rely on a
“familiar rul[e] of equity” to collect for the medical bills it had paid on the
81. See id. at 361.
82. Id. at 362–63 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 363.
84. 232 U.S. 117 (1914).
85. Id. at 119.
86. Id. at 123.
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Sereboffs’ behalf.  This rule allowed them to “follow” a portion of the recovery
“into the [Sereboffs’] hands” “as soon as [the settlement fund] was identified,”
and impose on that portion a constructive trust or equitable lien.87
The Sereboffs countered that the “strict tracing rules” applicable to
a constructive trust under the common law of equity required the plan
to show that a specific or identifiable asset owned by or belonging to
the plan was being wrongfully held by the Sereboffs, or had been ex-
changed for other similarly identifiable property.88  The Supreme
Court distinguished the situation in Sereboff because it involved an
equitable lien as equitable relief and not a constructive trust:
Barnes confirms that no tracing requirement of the sort asserted by the Ser-
eboffs applies to equitable liens by agreement or assignment: The plaintiffs in
Barnes could not identify an asset they originally possessed, which was im-
properly acquired and converted into property the defendant held, yet that did
not preclude them from securing an equitable lien.  To the extent Mid Atlan-
tic’s action is proper under Barnes, therefore, its asserted inability to satisfy
the “strict tracing rules” for “equitable restitution” is of no consequence.89
Finally, the Sereboffs argued that they should be permitted to as-
sert various equitable defenses to the plan’s equitable lien, notwith-
standing the language of the plan’s reimbursement clause that Mid
Atlantic’s share of the recovery could not be reduced without the
plan’s written agreement to such a reduction.90  The Supreme Court
found that “the parcel of equitable defenses the Sereboffs claim . . . are
beside the point,”91 and explained in footnote 2 of the opinion that
possible equitable defenses were not considered because their legal
counsel failed to make this argument at either the federal district
court or appellate court stages of the litigation.92
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sereboff was a blow to the plaintiffs’
personal injury bar, who remembered in subsequent litigation to as-
sert any and all possible equitable defenses whenever a self-insured
group health plan sought to enforce a reimbursement clause.  Predict-
ably, the federal circuit courts of appeals became divided over the is-
sue of equitable defenses to a plan’s claimed equitable lien.93  In US
87. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 364 (citations omitted).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 365.
90. See id. at 368.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 368 n.2.
93. The Third and Ninth Circuits ruled that equitable defenses could trump the lan-
guage of a plan reimbursement clause, whereas the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Elev-
enth, and District of Columbia Circuits ruled to the contrary. See CGI Techs. &
Sols., Inc. v. Rose, 683 F.3d 1113, 1124 (9th Cir. 2012); U.S. Airways v. Mc-
Cutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 673 (3d Cir. 2011); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O’Hara, 604
F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010); Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2007); Moore v. CapitalCare, Inc., 461 F.3d 1,
9–10 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Bombardier Aerospace Emp. Welfare Benefits Plan v. Fer-
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Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen,94 the Supreme Court revisited and re-
solved this issue.
3. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen
When James McCutchen was injured in a car accident, his em-
ployer’s self-insured group plan paid $66,866 in medical expenses aris-
ing from the accident.95  McCutchen’s attorneys were only able to
recover $10,000 from the driver who caused the accident, plus
$100,000 from McCutchen’s own insurer, for a total recovery of
$110,000.  After deducting attorneys’ fees of $44,000, McCutchen re-
ceived $66,000.96  The plan demanded reimbursement, which Mc-
Cutchen refused, but nevertheless his attorneys placed $41,500 in an
escrow account pending resolution of the dispute.  This amount repre-
sented the plan’s claim for reimbursement of the $66,866 in medical
expenses, minus the plan’s share of the 40% contingency fee charged
by McCutchen’s attorneys to secure the recovery.97
The plan brought a claim in federal district court against Mc-
Cutchen under section 502(a)(3) to enforce the reimbursement clause,
asserting an equitable lien on the sum of $66,866, which represented
the $41,500 in the escrow account and an additional $25,366 that was
in McCutchen’s possession.98  Oddly, the parties litigated the case all
the way to the Supreme Court based not on the reimbursement clause
language of the plan document itself, but rather on the following lan-
guage from the plan’s summary plan description:
If [US Airways] pays benefits for any claim you incur as the result of negli-
gence, willful misconduct, or other actions of a third party, . . . [y]ou will be
required to reimburse [US Airways] for amounts paid for claims out of any
monies recovered from [the] third party, including, but not limited to, your
own insurance company as the result of judgment, settlement, or otherwise.99
The Supreme Court decided that because “everyone in this case has
treated the language from the summary description as though it came
from the plan, we do so as well.”100
McCutchen countered the plan’s claim for an equitable lien with
various equitable defenses, which were refined by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court down to two specific doctrines designed to
prevent unjust enrichment.  The Supreme Court described Mc-
Cutchen’s two equitable defenses as follows:
rer, Poirot, & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 362 (5th Cir. 2003); Admin. Comm. of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 692 (7th Cir. 2003).
94. 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013).
95. Id. at 1543.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1543 n.1.
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First, [McCutchen] contends that in equity, an insurer in US Airways’ posi-
tion could recoup no more than an insured’s “double recovery”—the amount
the insured has received from a third party to compensate for the same loss
the insurance covered.  That rule would limit US Airways’ reimbursement to
the share of McCutchen’s settlements paying for medical expenses; Mc-
Cutchen would keep the rest (e.g., damages for loss of future earnings or pain
and suffering), even though the plan gives US Airways first claim on the
whole third-party recovery.  Second, McCutchen claims that in equity the
common-fund doctrine would have operated to reduce any award to US Air-
ways.  Under that rule, “a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for
the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasona-
ble attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.”  McCutchen urges that this doc-
trine, which is designed to prevent freeloading, enables him to pass on a share
of his lawyer’s fees to US Airways, no matter what the plan provides.101
The Supreme Court emphatically rejected McCutchen’s arguments
based on its prior precedent in Sereboff:
Sereboff’s logic dooms McCutchen’s effort.  US Airways, like Mid Atlantic, is
seeking to enforce the modern-day equivalent of an “equitable lien by agree-
ment.”  And that kind of lien—as its name announces—both arises from and
serves to carry out a contract’s provisions.  So enforcing the lien means hold-
ing the parties to their mutual promises.  Conversely, it means declining to
apply rules—even if they would be “equitable” in a contract’s absence—at
odds with the parties’ expressed commitments.102
Continuing with this line of reasoning, the McCutchen Court ex-
pressly rejected the argument of the Solicitor General, appearing as
amicus curiae, that the terms of the plan document do not control
when equitably apportioning litigation costs based on the common-
fund doctrine.103  According to the Supreme Court, “if the agreement
governs, the agreement governs,” without any special exception for
the equitable allocation of attorneys’ fees.104
McCutchen did recognize that even though equitable principles
cannot trump an express plan term, if the plan document is silent or
ambiguous then equitable rules and doctrines may be used as “gap-
fillers” to construe the plan’s terms as a matter of federal common
law.105  Based on the language of the plan’s summary plan descrip-
tion, the Supreme Court found that although the reimbursement lan-
guage prohibited application of the double-recovery rule, it said
“nothing specific” about the payment or allocation of the attorneys’
fees incurred to obtain the recovery.106  Due to this drafting gap, the
McCutchen Court ruled that “the common-fund doctrine provides the
best indication of the parties’ intent,”107 reasoning that “[a] party
would not typically expect or intend a plan saying nothing about attor-
101. Id. at 1545 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 1546 (citations omitted).
103. See id. at 1547.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1548.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1550.
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ney’s fees to abrogate so strong and uniform a background rule.  And
that means a court should be loath to read such a plan in that way.”108
Thus, McCutchen answered the question of possible equitable de-
fenses to an equitable lien left unanswered in Sereboff by leaving it up
to the employer who sponsors the plan.  Predictably, employers re-
sponded to McCutchen by amending the language of their plan docu-
ments to preclude application of the make-whole rule, the common-
fund doctrine, unjust enrichment-based theories and doctrines, and
any other imaginable defense available in a common law court of eq-
uity that could possibly be asserted by a plan participant in ERISA
subrogation claim litigation.109
McCutchen left unanswered, however, the second question raised
in Great-West, namely how strictly the federal courts should construe
the Supreme Court’s statement that “for restitution to lie in equity,
the action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the
defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property
in the defendant’s possession.”110 Montanile v. Board of Trustees111
answered this question.
4. Montanile v. Board of Trustees
Robert Montanile was injured by a drunk driver in an automobile
accident.  His health care plan paid approximately $121,044 for his
initial medical care after the accident.112  The plan required
Montanile to sign a reimbursement agreement “reaffirming” his obli-
gation to reimburse the plan from any recovery he obtained “as a re-
sult of any legal action or settlement or otherwise.”113
Montanile sued the driver and obtained a $500,000 settlement.  Af-
ter paying his attorney $260,000 in fees and costs, Montanile had suf-
ficient funds to reimburse the plan.  His attorney held Montanile’s
remaining $240,000 share of the settlement in a client trust account
while attempting to negotiate an agreement with the plan concerning
108. Id.  In a footnote to this passage, the McCutchen Court observed that “almost
every state court that has confronted the issue has done what we do here: apply
the common–fund doctrine in the face of a contract giving an insurer a general
right to recoup funds from an insured’s third-party recovery, without specifically
addressing attorney’s fees.” Id. at 1550 n.8 (citing numerous state court deci-
sions).  This almost universal adoption of the common-fund doctrine as a matter
of state common law provides strong support for the statutory amendment solu-
tion proposed in Part IV of the Article. See discussion infra section IV.B.
109. For an exemplar of a post-McCutchen plan reimbursement clause, see infra sec-
tion II.C.
110. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212–14 (2002).
111. 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016).
112. See id. at 655.  Montanile was a member of a collective bargaining unit and his
coverage was through a multiemployer plan. Id.
113. Id. at 656.
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reimbursement.114  After negotiations broke down, Montanile’s attor-
ney warned the plan that he would distribute the $240,000 to
Montanile if the plan did not object within 14 days.  The plan did not
respond and so the attorney distributed the funds to Montanile, who
then spent some or all of the funds (this fact was not definitely re-
solved at the trial court level) on nontraceable items.115
Six months after the negotiations ended, the plan sued Montanile
in federal district court under section 502(a)(3) to enforce the plan’s
reimbursement clause and recover the $121,044.02 that the plan had
expended for Montanile’s medical expenses.  The plan sought an equi-
table lien on any “settlement funds or any property” that remained in
Montanile’s possession.116  In addition, the plan asked the district
court to enjoin Montanile from dissipating any settlement funds in his
possession.  The district court granted summary judgment to the plan
and ruled that the plan was entitled to reimbursement from
Montanile’s general assets, rejecting the argument that because
Montanile had spent almost all of the settlement funds on nontrace-
able items there was no “specific, identifiable fund” to which an equi-
table lien could attach.117  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over
whether an equitable reimbursement clause lien could be enforced
against a participant’s general assets when the participant dissipates
the “specific, identifiable fund.”118
The Montanile Court described the terms of the plan’s reimburse-
ment clause as follows:
The plan states: “Amounts that have been recovered by a [participant] from
another party are assets of the Plan . . . and are not distributable to any per-
son or entity without the Plan’s written release of its subrogation interest.”
The plan also provides that “any amounts” that a participant “recover[s] from
another party by award, judgment, settlement or otherwise . . . will promptly
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id.  Prior to Montanile, the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
had held that an ERISA plan may enforce an equitable lien against a defendant’s
general assets even if the fund has been dissipated, whereas the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits had held that it may not.  Compare Cusson v. Liberty Life Assur-
ance Co., 592 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 2010) (plan may collect from defendant even
though the fund was no longer in the defendant’s possession or control), Thurber
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 712 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 2013) (same), Funk v. CIGNA Grp.
Ins., 648 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (same), Longaberger Co. v. Kolt, 586 F.3d 459
(6th Cir. 2009) (same), and Gutta v. Standard Select Trust Ins. Plans, 530 F.3d
614 (7th Cir. 2008) (same), with Treasurer, Trustees of Drury Indus., Inc. Health
Care Plan & Trust v. Goding, 692 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2012) (when the defendant is
no longer in possession of a fund, a plan cannot enforce an equitable lien), and
Bilyeu v. Morgan Stanley Long Term Disability Plan, 683 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir.
2012) (same).
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be applied first to reimburse the Plan in full for benefits advanced by the
Plan . . . and without reduction for attorneys’ fees, costs, expenses or damages
claimed by the covered person.”  Participants must notify the plan and obtain
its consent before settling claims.119
The Supreme Court reviewed the holdings of Great-West, Sereboff,
and McCutchen, and then distinguished Sereboff and McCutchen from
the situation in Montanile on the ground that the plaintiffs in Sereboff
and McCutchen sought “specifically identifiable funds” that were
within the plan participants’ possession or control.120  In contrast, the
disputed funds in Montanile had been dissipated by the participant
before the plan brought its subrogation enforcement claim.121  The Su-
preme Court found this fact dispositive because under principles of
equity, “[a] defendant’s expenditure of the entire identifiable fund on
nontraceable items (like food or travel) destroys an equitable lien.  The
plaintiff then may have a personal claim against the defendant’s gen-
eral assets—but recovering out of those assets is a legal remedy, not
an equitable one.”122  According to the Montanile Court, equitable
remedies “are, as a general rule, directed against some specific
thing.”123  According to the Supreme Court, the participant’s dissipa-
tion of the funds, even when done wrongfully to thwart enforcement of
the equitable lien, does not create an exception to the rule that an
equitable lien cannot be enforced against a defendant’s general as-
sets.124  In other words, the participant Montanile’s inequitable con-
duct successfully defeated the plan’s claim for equitable relief.
The Montanile Court pointedly rejected the plan’s policy-based ar-
guments that, “unless plans can enforce reimbursement provisions
against a defendant’s general assets, plans will lack effective or cost-
efficient remedies, and participants will dissipate any settlement as
quickly as possible, before [plan] fiduciaries can sue.”125  In particu-
lar, the plan complained that “tracking and participating in legal pro-
ceedings is hard and costly” and “settlements are often shrouded in
secrecy.”126  The Supreme Court offered three justifications for re-
jecting these policy arguments.  The Montanile Court began by observ-
ing that “vague notions of a statute’s ‘basic purpose’
are . . . inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the
specific issue under consideration.”127  Next, the Montanile Court in-
119. Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 655 (citations omitted).
120. See id. at 658.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting S. SYMONS, POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1234, at 694 (5th ed.
1941)).
124. See id. at 659.
125. Id. at 661.
126. Id. at 662.
127. Id. at 661.
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vited Congress to address the problem, and even proposed how section
502(a)(3) might be amended:
Had Congress sought to prioritize the [plan]’s policy arguments, it could have
drafted § 502(a)(3) to mirror ERISA provisions governing civil actions.  One of
those provisions, for instance, allows participants and beneficiaries to bring
civil actions “to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the plan” and does not
limit them to equitable relief.128
Finally, the Montanile Court dismissed the plan’s practical policy ar-
gument that monitoring state court tort lawsuits, recoveries, and the
distribution of funds was difficult and expensive, noting that the plan
had been warned that the settlement funds would be distributed, but
nevertheless waited “half a year” to bring its reimbursement claim.129
C. The Plan Administrator’s Reaction to McCutchen and
Montanile
In response to McCutchen, employers who sponsored self-insured
group health plans amended the language of their plan reimburse-
ment clauses.130  The conventional wisdom became that plan reim-
bursement provisions should expressly provide for the plan to receive
full reimbursement prior to the injured participant receiving any of
the funds obtained from a third party, while clearly negating all equi-
table defenses such as the make whole rule, the common- fund doc-
trine, or any other equitable rule or doctrine that could reduce the
plan’s first-dollar recovery.131  Today, a robust plan reimbursement
clause would read like this:
Right of Reimbursement
The Plan, in its sole discretion, may conditionally advance
payment of medical benefits in situations where an injury,
128. Id.
129. See id. at 662.  Justice Ginsberg alone dissented from the majority opinion in
Montanile.  She found that permitting a participant to escape a contractual reim-
bursement obligation by spending settlement funds quickly on nontraceable
items to be a “bizarre conclusion” attributable to the Supreme Court’s prior deci-
sion in Great-West and its progeny, which she viewed as erroneously interpreting
the meaning of “appropriate equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3).  Id. (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
130. Pursuant to the settlor function doctrine, “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are
generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or ter-
minate welfare plans.”  Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78
(1995); see Colleen E. Medill, Regulating ERISA Fiduciary Outsourcing, 102 IOWA
L. REV. 505, 522–24 & nn.107–121 (2017) (describing Supreme Court decisions
creating the settlor function doctrine).
131. E.g., John E. B. Gerth & Stanley E. Graham, Slicing the Pie: Protecting Health
Plan Subrogation Rights Post McCutchen, 27 HEALTH L. 44, 46 (2014); Bart A.
Karwath & Brian E. Casey, Supreme Court: Health Plan Reimbursement Provi-
sions Trump Equitable Doctrines, RES GESTAE 10, 14 (Oct. 2013).
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sickness, disease or disability is caused in whole or in part by,
or results from, the acts or omissions of a third party.  The
Participant agrees that acceptance of the Plan’s conditional
payment of medical benefits is constructive notice of these re-
imburse provisions in their entirety.  The Plan shall be enti-
tled to recover 100% of the benefits paid, without any
deduction or reduction for attorneys’ fees and costs, and with-
out application of the make-whole rule, the common-fund doc-
trine, equitable principles designed to prevent unjust
enrichment, or any other similar legal or equitable theory or
doctrine, without regard to whether the Participant is fully
compensated by the Participant’s recovery from all sources.
This right of reimbursement shall bind the Participant’s
guardian, estate, executor, personal representative, and
heir(s).
No court costs, experts’ fees, attorneys’ fees, filing fees, or
other costs or expenses of litigation may be deducted from the
Plan’s recovery without the prior, express written consent of
the Plan.  Even if the Participant’s recovery is less than the
medical benefits paid by the Plan, the Plan is entitled to be
paid all of the recovery achieved, without reduction for attor-
ney’s fees and costs.
By accepting medical benefits from the Plan, the Participant
agrees the Plan shall have an equitable lien on any funds re-
ceived by the Participant and/or the Participant’s attorney
from any source.  The Plan’s equitable lien shall supersede all
common law or statutory rules, doctrines, and laws of any
State prohibiting assignment of rights that may interfere with
or compromise in any way the Plan’s equitable lien and right
to reimbursement.  The obligation of the Participant to reim-
burse the Plan in full exists regardless of how the judgment or
settlement is classified and whether or not the judgment or
settlement specifically designates the recovery or a portion of
it as including medical care expenses.
The Participant agrees to request that the Plan’s name be in-
cluded as a co-payee on any and all checks made payable to
Participant and/or the Participant’s attorney.  If the Partici-
pant fails to reimburse the Plan in accordance with these Plan
provisions out of any judgment or settlement received, the
Participant will be responsible for any and all expenses, in-
cluding but not limited to attorney’s fees and costs, associated
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with the Plan’s attempt to enforce these reimbursement
provisions.132
After Montanile, some self-insured group health plans added an in-
ternal “penalty” for the failure to reimburse the plan by providing that
future benefits would be offset by the reimbursement amount owed to
the plan.  A typical offset penalty provision would read like this:
Offset of Benefits
If timely reimbursement is not made to the Plan, or if the Par-
ticipant fails to comply with any of the requirements of the
Plan regarding the Plan’s right of reimbursement, the Plan
has the right, in addition to any other lawful means of recov-
ery, to offset payment of any future medical benefits under
this Plan on behalf of the Participant in an amount equivalent
to any outstanding amounts owed by the Participant to the
Plan.133
Armed with this type of reimbursement clause language, sophisti-
cated plan administrators today engage in proactive measures to en-
force the plan’s right of reimbursement.134  Post-McCutchen and
Montanile, the law of ERISA subrogation claims creates significant
problems for injured plan participants, the personal injury bar, em-
ployer-sponsored self-insured group health plans and their plan ad-
ministrators, and federal and state courts.  These problems, which are
described in detail below in Part II, could be resolved (at least in part)
by the targeted statutory amendment proposed in Part III of the
Article.
III. POST-MCCUTCHEN AND MONTANILE PROBLEMS
A. Disincentives to Litigate Personal Injury Claims or
Cooperate with Plan Administrators
As a result of McCutchen, injured participants with health care
coverage through a self-insured group health plan are less likely to
132. This reimbursement provision is an exemplar based on the authors’ review of
plan document language from a variety of published and unpublished sources
combined with original drafting.
133. This offset of future benefits provision is an exemplar based on the authors’ re-
view of various plan document language from a variety of published and unpub-
lished sources combined with original drafting.
134. See Baron & Lamb, supra note 43, at 325 n.4 (quoting a spokesperson for the
subrogation industry as stating that “There are certain employers who perhaps
have a terminator attitude with regard to pursing subrogation even in the light of
some of the most atrocious circumstances.”).
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litigate personal injury claims.  No participant wants to serve “as an
unpaid collection agent for the plan,”135 a result that is more likely if
the plan requires first-dollar, full reimbursement of medical expenses
paid without sharing in the costs to pursue litigation against a third
party who caused the participant’s injuries.
The plaintiffs’ personal injury bar has reacted to McCutchen with a
range of responses that have resulted in fewer personal injury actions
being filed on behalf of participants in self-insured plans, and less co-
operation with plan administrators if a case is filed.  This range of
responses, and the resulting adverse impacts, are summarized below.
1. Screen and Decline Borderline Cases
The facts of McCutchen perfectly illustrate the dilemma of the in-
jured participant’s prospective lawyer, who usually must rely on a
contingency fee set as a percentage of the total recovery as compensa-
tion for her legal services.136  As a result of McCutchen, plaintiffs’ per-
sonal injury lawyers must screen potential cases and evaluate at a
very early stage two critical factors: (1) the amount the prospective
plaintiff’s health plan will require as reimbursement for medical ex-
penses; and (2) the amount of insurance coverage and other assets
held by the defendant.  If the amount required as reimbursement by
an employer’s self-insured health care plan makes it unlikely that the
injured plan participant will net anything from the tort recovery, then
the contingency fee lawyer has two options.  One option, attempting to
negotiate a lesser reimbursement amount with the participant’s self-
insured plan, is discussed below.  The other option is to simply decline
to represent the injured plan participant.137
By deferring to plan document language that rejects application of
the common-fund doctrine in determining the amount of reimburse-
135. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1550 (2013).
136. The result in McCutchen, where the injured plan participant achieved a negative
net recovery after reimbursement of the plan and the payment of his attorney’s
fees and costs, is certainly possible, particularly for severely injured participants
with large medical bills.  For other examples, see Jonathan P. Connery, Note and
Comment, Personal Injury Victims As Insurance Collection Agents: ERISA Pre-
emption of State Antisubrogation Laws, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 131, 131–33 (2015)
(describing the Shank and Ridler cases) and Baron & Lamb, supra note 44, at 326
n.5 (collecting cases where the amount of the reimbursement to the plan ad-
versely impacted a severely injured plan participant).
137. See Karen Ertel, Insurer May Take Share of Damages Award, Supreme Court
Rules, 42 TRIAL 92 (July 2006) (quoting an attorney as saying that personal in-
jury lawyers “simply will walk away” from cases involving potentially large ER-
ISA health plan claims for reimbursement as a result of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Sereboff); Karwath & Casey, supra note 131, at 14 (“If there will be little
or nothing left for injured parties after paying the lawyers and reimbursing the
health plan, injured parties will have little or no incentive to pursue claims
against third parties”).
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ment owed to the plan, McCutchen creates two negative effects.  First,
self-insured plans in general are likely to recoup less in reimburse-
ments overall because injured plan participants and their attorneys,
acting in a risk-adverse fashion under decision-making conditions of
uncertainty, are more likely to decline cases that could result in some
level of reimbursement for the plan.138  From the perspective of the
personal injury attorney who renders legal services on a contingency
fee basis, the precise calculation of damages in a personal injury law-
suit can be challenging.139  Moreover, the defendant’s insurance cov-
erage and other potential assets typically cannot be ascertained with
certainty until the claim has been filed and the discovery process is
underway.  The calculation of the potential net recovery by the injured
participant, however, must at least be estimated to be in the positive
range before the attorney will undertake the representation.
The second negative effect of McCutchen falls on society as a whole.
As the Seventh Circuit explained, the “prospect [that a plan will not
have to pay its share of attorneys’ fees] might well deter a suit likely
to result in a judgment or settlement not much higher than the bene-
fits available under the plan—and in that event the language on
which the plan relies would produce undercompensation for harms
that were unrelated to the type of harm to which benefits pertain.”140
When severe injuries are undercompensated due to artificial incen-
tives, the burden of care and support ultimately may be borne by gov-
ernment-provided, taxpayer-financed social services.
2. Attempt to Pre-Negotiate a Set Reimbursement Amount
Prior to McCutchen, it was not uncommon for a plan administrator
(or the plan’s stop-loss insurer as the plan’s assignee) to negotiate in
advance of the commencement of personal injury litigation with the
injured participant’s lawyer regarding a reduction in the amount of
the anticipated recovery that must be paid as reimbursement to the
plan.  This negotiated discount served as an indirect recognition that
the plan would bear a share of the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in
the personal injury litigation that produced the recovery by accepting
138. See Karwath & Casey, supra note 131, at 14 (“Reimbursements that might other-
wise be obtained for health plans might be uncollected because the injured party
has no incentive to obtain a recovery.”).
139. See Kristin L. Huffaker, Note, Where the Windfall Falls Short: “Appropriate Eq-
uitable Relief” After Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 61 OKLA. L.
REV. 233, 249 (2008) (explaining that courts have difficulty in calculating the eco-
nomic value of damages for permanent disability, mental anguish, physical pain,
loss of income, and future aspects of each of these components).
140. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402
(7th Cir. 2000).
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less than full reimbursement.141  After McCutchen, with robust plan
document language such as the exemplar presented in Part I.C of the
Article, today there is much less incentive for the plan administrator
to negotiate a reduced reimbursement amount.
ERISA fiduciary law, however, may in some circumstances compel
the plan administrator to accept a discounted reimbursement as full
payment.  For example, assume that without a negotiated discount
the plan will recover nothing at all for a very large medical bill be-
cause a claim for first-dollar, full reimbursement without cost-sharing
of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses renders the case economi-
cally infeasible on a contingency-fee basis.  In this situation, a reduced
recoupment for the plan in exchange for litigation cost-sharing would
appear to be the more prudent choice for the plan administrator.  It is
at least arguable that if an attorney on behalf of an injured plan par-
ticipant contacts the plan with an offer to negotiate litigation cost-
sharing, the plan administrator has an affirmative fiduciary duty
under ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule and the duty of prudence to eval-
uate the offer in light of the potential net recovery of plan assets.142  If
enforcement will result in a significant reimbursement to the plan,
thereby increasing the pool of assets available to pay other participant
claims for health care benefits, then the plan administrator may have
a fiduciary duty to accept the offer.143  In short, “a bird in the hand is
worth two in the bush.”144
Negotiating a reduced reimbursement amount in disregard of the
plan reimbursement clause language was considered to be a “matter of
practice” among plan administrators prior to McCutchen.145  For ex-
ample, a plan administrator might choose to negotiate a reduced reim-
bursement claim amount in exchange for an agreement by the
participant’s attorney to limit the scope of the participant’s document
requests made to the plan administrator under ERISA section
141. See Gerth & Graham, supra note 131, at 46; Karwath & Casey, supra note 131, at
15.
142. See discussion supra text and notes 42–43.
143. See Karwath & Casey, supra note 131, at 14–15 (“Health plans . . . [may] have to
decide whether they want to directly pursue (and fund) litigation against third
parties or simply go without otherwise available reimbursements. For this rea-
son, a health plan should be willing to reduce its reimbursement claim so that the
injured person has greater incentives to pursue recovery from the third party.”).
144. Ecclesiastes 6:9–11.
145. See Gerth & Graham, supra note 131, at 46 (“Many health plans as a matter of
practice effectively follow the common fund doctrine by making a reduction to
reimbursement claims to account for a pro rata portion of attorneys’ fees, even in
circumstances where the plan expressly disclaims any such requirement.  The
reasons for doing so run the gamut, from a sense that it is fait for the health plan
to share in the cost of the recovery to the economic reality that negotiating for full
reimbursement for every claim increases administrative expenses for plan
administrators.”).
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104(b)(4)146 as a way to reduce the administrative expenses associated
with the litigation.147
This “everything’s negotiable” approach is actually consistent with
the plan administrator’s responsibility to execute his fiduciary duties
of plan administration “in accordance with the documents and instru-
ments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of [ERISA].”148  Section
404(a)(1)(D)’s underlying purpose is to provide an important check on
potential employer overreaching under the settlor function doctrine by
requiring that the plan administrator must disregard any terms of the
plan that would be contrary to ERISA’s other statutory provisions.149
In the context of reimbursement clause enforcement and related nego-
tiations, the exclusive benefit rule and the fiduciary duty of prudence
may require the plan administrator to disregard the plain language of
the plan’s reimbursement clause.150
3. Ignore Reimbursement Demand Letters or Provide a Non-
Binding Response
Montanile obviously incentivizes injured plan participants to sim-
ply ignore reimbursement demand letters from the plan’s administra-
tor.  Due to the pre-existing relationship between the plan and the
injured participant, however, the participant who accepts health care
benefits from the plan will most likely be contractually bound to reim-
burse the plan (unless the recovered funds are dissipated, as in
Montanile, before the plan administrator takes legal action).  The ex-
emplar of a plan reimbursement clause presented in section I.C.
makes this legal right of reimbursement in exchange for plan benefits
very clear.
Unlike the participant, the participant’s personal injury lawyer
does not have a pre-existing relationship with the plan and is not
bound by the terms of the plan’s reimbursement clause.  For the par-
ticipant’s attorney, the quandary becomes whether, and if so how, to
respond to a reimbursement demand letter without contractually
146. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (2012).
147. See Gerth & Graham, supra note 131, at 46.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2012).
149. See Medill, supra note 130, at 546 & n.235 (quoting Fifth Third Bancorp. v.
Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2468 (“the duty of prudence trumps the instruc-
tions of a plan document”) (emphasis added)).
150. See discussion supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  Of course, evaluating
whether or not a positive net recovery of plan assets warrants disregarding the
plan’s reimbursement clause language is a case-by-case determination that by
definition lends itself to uncertainty.  For this reason, our preferred approach
would be a clear statutory rule that self-insured plans must cost-share in the tort
recovery in lieu of a less certain case-by-case evaluation. See discussion infra
section IV.A.
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binding the attorney to later reimburse the plan if the participant fails
to do so.
The facts of Drury Industries, Inc. Health Care Plan and Trust v.
Goding151 provide a tutorial on how personal injury attorneys can re-
spond, in a non-binding way, to a plan reimbursement letter.  The
plan participant, Sean Goding, was injured in a slip and fall accident
and received $11,423.79 in benefits from the plan.  The participant
later received compensation for his injuries in a tort settlement of a
negligence claim.  The plan attempted to secure reimbursement from
the participant, but was unable to do so because the participant de-
clared bankruptcy.152
The plan then attempted to obtain reimbursement from the law
firm that had represented the participant in the negligence action
based on the following plan reimbursement clause language, coupled
with the attorney’s correspondence with the plan’s administrator.
The Administrator, on behalf of the Employer, has first priority for the full
amount of benefits they have paid from any Recovery regardless of whether
you are fully compensated, and regardless of whether the payments you re-
ceive make you whole for your losses and injuries.
You and your legal representative must do whatever is necessary to enable the
Administrator, on behalf of the Employer, to exercise their rights and do noth-
ing to prejudice them.
. . .
To the extent that the total assets from which a Recovery is available are
insufficient to satisfy in full the Administrator’s subrogation claim and any
claim still held by you, the Administrator’s subrogation claim shall be first
satisfied before any part of Recovery is applied to your claim, your attorney
fees, other expenses or costs.153
During the attorney’s representation of the Goding in the negli-
gence action, the attorney had corresponded with the plan on two oc-
casions.  First, the attorney wrote to the plan administrator stating
“[t]his will confirm that we do acknowledge [the plan]’s lien in this
matter.”154  Several months later, the attorney wrote to the plan stat-
ing “we are not challenging your right to reimbursement/subrogation
for payments made for the health care of Sean Goding relating [to] the
injuries caused by his fall at the Hilton.”155  Based on these state-
ments, the plan sued the attorney and his law firm in federal district
court under ERISA section 502(a)(3), based on various equitable theo-
151. 692 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2012).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 891–92 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 892.
155. Id.
2017] ERISA SUBROGATION 631
ries including an equitable lien by agreement, restitution, and imposi-
tion of a constructive trust.156
The district court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor
of the defendants, and awarded attorney’s fees to the attorney’s law
firm for its defense costs.  The plan appealed both the grant of sum-
mary judgment and the attorney’s fees award to the Eighth Circuit,
which affirmed the district court’s ruling on both issues.157  In so do-
ing, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis provides clear guidance to the per-
sonal injury bar and plan administrators on what constitutes a
binding reimbursement agreement between the plan and the injured
participant’s lawyer:
A subrogation agreement between a client and an ERISA plan is only enforce-
able against a client’s attorney if the attorney agrees with a client and a plan
to honor the plan’s subrogation right.
In [Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union Welfare
Fund v.] Gentner ,158 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[m]ere notice or
knowledge of the subrogation agreement or lien does not constitute an implied
contract between the attorney and the plan.”  In that case, the cli-
ent . . . executed a subrogation agreement with the fund . . . . [His] attorney
was aware of the subrogation agreement but did not sign or otherwise agree to
it.  The Ninth Circuit held that under these facts, the fund could not enforce
the lien as an implied contract against the attorney.
Unlike in Gentner, the attorney in [Southern Council of Industrial Workers v.]
Ford159 not only knew about the subrogation agreement but also himself
signed the subrogation agreement.  In that case, before the client settled her
personal injury claim with the plan administrator, both she and her attorney
signed a subrogation agreement providing that they would reimburse the fund
from the proceeds of any recovery received for the client’s injuries.  This was
the key fact for our holding in that case.  Citing Gentner, we determined that
[b]ecause [the attorney] himself signed the subrogation agreement, . . . the
complaint also stated an ERISA claim against him for violation of the subro-
gation clause.
Here, [the plan] argues that [the participant’s attorney] should be bound by
the subrogation agreement on the basis of two letters . . . sent to [the plan
administrator]. . . . .[The statements in the two letters] clearly acknowledge
the validity and existence of a subrogation agreement between [the partici-
pant] and [the plan].  However, absent from these statements or any other
communication identified by [the plan] is a promise by [the participant’s attor-
ney] to take any action to himself enforce the subrogation agreement or even
to ensure that [the participant] abide by it.
Without such a promise, the acknowledgment alone is insufficient to establish
an implied contract. . . . . Although [the participant’s attorney] acknowledged
the existence of the lien against the settlement . . ., [the attorney]  never
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. 50 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 1995).
159. 83 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1996).
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agreed with [the plan] and [the participant] to honor the [p]lan’s subrogation
right.  Because [the participant’s attorney] was not a party to the subrogation
agreement, [the plan] cannot enforce that agreement against [the partici-
pant’s attorney].160
4. Distribute and Dissipate the Recovered Funds to Avoid an
Equitable Lien
Montanile clearly encourages plan participants to quickly spend
any amounts recovered as compensation in a personal injury action on
nontraceable assets.161  If a participant ignores the plan’s demand let-
ter, collects on a personal injury claim, and then quickly spends the
recovered funds, if the plan document so provides the plan adminis-
trator can offset the payment of future plan benefits.162  But if the
injured participant does not intend to return to work, this benefit off-
set “penalty” will not be an effective deterrent to a participant who
wants to “take the money and run.”163
B. Obstacles to Reimbursement Clause Enforcement
As frustrating as ERISA subrogation claims may be for injured
plan participants and the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar, the status
quo is equally, if not more, frustrating for plan administrators.  As
explained below, the current system presents numerous practical and
procedural obstacles to the efficient enforcement of plan reimburse-
ment clauses for employer self-insured plans.  The required monitor-
ing of personal injury claims brought by plan participants primarily in
the state courts, coupled with exclusively federal subject matter juris-
diction over the plan’s reimbursement claim, result in both higher
plan administrative costs and a waste of state and federal judicial re-
sources due to bifurcated state court/federal court adjudications.
1. Heightened Monitoring (the “letter writing campaign”)
After Montanile, plan administrators must closely monitor poten-
tial tort litigation and related disbursements of funds to injured plan
participants.164  Although this point is self-evident, in practice such
monitoring is cumbersome, difficult, and costly for the plan.165  Even
though a “letter writing campaign” by itself cannot avoid distribution
160. Drury Indus., 692 F.3d at 894–95 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
161. See discussion supra subsection II.B.4.
162. For an illustration, see the offset of benefits exemplar presented in section II.C.
163. See Noah Lipschultz, Go On, Take the Money and Run—Supreme Court Limits
ERISA Plans’ Reimbursement Rights, 24 ERISA LITIG. REP., Issue 1, *1 (Feb.
2016) (quoting STEVE MILLER BAND, Take the Money and Run, on FLY LIKE AN
EAGLE (Capitol Records 1976)).
164. See discussion infra subsection III.B.1.
165. See Lipschultz, supra note 163, at *3 (criticizing the Montanile Court’s “star-
tlingly naı̈ve” assumption that it is easy for plans to prevent dissipation of settle-
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and dissipation of the recovered funds by the participant (or bind a
savvy personal injury attorney), it is required by the plan administra-
tor’s fiduciary duties.166  As explained below, the plan administrator
may attempt to take the most direct route to securing reimbursement
by intervening in the state court tort action, but the outcome of this
approach is uncertain due to the exclusively federal nature of claims
to enforce a plan reimbursement clause.167  The plan administrator
may be able to seek to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief in federal
court to control the disbursement of funds in the underlying state
court action, but again, the law in this area is murky.168  This leaves
the plan administrator with one certain (but expensive) option,
namely to sue the participant (and possibly her personal injury attor-
ney) in federal district court by asserting a claim for injunctive or eq-
uitable relief under ERISA section 502(a)(3).169
2. Intervention in the Participant’s State Court Tort Action
The possibility of intervention in the participant’s state court tort
action was raised, but not addressed, in Great-West. In part due to the
odd procedural posture of the case, the majority opinion noted that
“[w]e express no opinion as to whether petitioners could have inter-
vened in the state-court tort action brought by respondents or whether
a direct action by petitioners against respondents asserting state-law
claims such as breach of contract would have been pre-empted by ER-
ISA.”170  Since Great-West was decided, at least one legal scholar has
argued that any state law-based attempt to enforce an ERISA plan
reimbursement clause in state court is preempted by ERISA.171
The state courts have ruled both for and against attempts at inter-
vention by plan administrators.172  The outcomes of these state court
cases, which predate Sereboff, appear to turn on how both the partici-
pant’s claim in the state court action, and the attempted intervention
ment funds through monitoring and will not pose hardship or additional costs on
plans).
166. See discussion supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
167. See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.
168. See discussion infra subsection III.B.3.
169. See discussion infra subsection III.B.4.
170. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220 (2002).
171. See E. Farish Percy, Applying the Common Fund Doctrine to an ERISA-Governed
Employee Benefit Plan’s Claim for Subrogation or Reimbursement, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 55, 72 (2009) (“state-law claims for subrogation or reimbursement are pre-
empted regardless of whether the plan fiduciary initiates a direct civil action
against the plan participant or third-party tortfeasor, or moves to intervene in
the plan participant’s tort case. Given that the plan fiduciary’s ability to inter-
vene on behalf of the plan is based on plan subrogation and reimbursement provi-
sions, such intervention ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan in exactly the same
way a direct claim for reimbursement or subrogation does.”).
172. See discussion infra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.
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by the plan administrator, are characterized by the state court.  If the
attempted intervention is characterized as an attempt by the plan ad-
ministrator to enforce the terms of the reimbursement clause under
ERISA section 502(a)(3),173 then intervention will not be allowed due
to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the state court.174  The  Lou-
isiana Supreme Court’s reasoning in A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc., v.
Slidell Memorial Hospital,175 described below, reflects this approach.
If, however, the attempted intervention is characterized as related to
a claim by the participant “to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan”
under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B),176 then the state courts have con-
current subject matter jurisdiction,177 and the attempted intervention
may be successful.  The Mississippi Supreme Court’s analysis in Yerby
v. United Healthcare Insurance Co.,178 described after Copeland En-
terprises, illustrates this type of reasoning.
In Copeland Enterprises, the plan administrator intervened in a
state district court medical malpractice action against the partici-
pant’s health care providers seeking reimbursement of $731,602.57 in
medical expenses paid by the plan on the participant’s behalf.179  The
Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the state district court
erred in granting the motion to intervene because the state district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the merits of the
plan administrator’s subrogation claim:
Congress specifically bestowed upon state courts concurrent jurisdiction in
matters arising under [ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) . . . . That being the case, we,
construing [ERISA § 502] narrowly, interpret this section to mean that a PAR-
TICIPANT or a BENEFICIARY may bring an action in either state or federal court
to 1) recover benefits due to him; 2) enforce his rights; and 3) clarify his rights
to future benefits, under the terms of the plan . . . . Here, Copeland is neither
the proper party (a participant [or a ]beneficiary . . .) to bring an action in this
Court under ERISA, nor is this action one that falls within the scope of this
Court’s concurrent jurisdiction. Copeland is the fiduciary seeking to enforce a
subrogation right under the terms of its employee benefit plan. It is apparent
that this action is not within the realm of this Court’s concurrent jurisdiction
as enumerated by [ERISA]. Thus, based upon the clear wording of section
[502], the federal district court would have exclusive subject matter jurisdic-
tion to determine whether Copeland is entitled to reimbursement pursuant to
a subrogation agreement.180
173. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
174. § 1132(e)(1).
175. 657 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1995).
176. § 1132(a)(1)(b).
177. § 1132(e)(1).
178. 846 So. 2d 179, 186–87 (Miss. 2002).
179. See Copeland Enters., 657 So. 2d at 1294–95.
180. Id. at 1302; see also Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Krafka, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723,
726–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Copeland Enters., 657 So. 2d at 1302).  The
Kansas Supreme Court subsequently relied on Copeland Enterprises to dismiss a
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In contrast, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Yerby v. United
Healthcare Insurance Co.181 permitted the plan’s designated subroga-
tion collection agent to intervene in a state tort action filed by a plan
participant who had been injured in an automobile accident.  The col-
lection agent claimed that that the plan was contractually entitled to
recover any benefits paid or payable for medical treatment of the par-
ticipant out of any tort recovery.182  The Mississippi Supreme Court
agreed, reasoning as follows:
The case at hand presents the very issue that the Supreme Court refrained
from deciding [in Great-West] (“We express no opinion as to whether petition-
ers could have intervened in the state-court tort action brought by respon-
dents  . . .”). Yerby denies that United, as an intervening fiduciary, is able to
seek relief on a claim that it could not have initiated itself under
§ [502](a)(1)(B) (only “participant or beneficiary” may bring action) . . .[T] he
inability of United to have initiated suit under § [502]2(a)(1)(B) in no way
barred it from intervening of right under [Mississippi Civil Procedure] Rule
24(a)(2).
Further, while the Supreme Court stated that cases under § [502](a)(3) may
only provide equitable relief, it specifically noted that the same requirement is
not mandated in § [502](a)(1)(B), which both parties agree is the section at
issue in this case. Knudson, 122 S. Ct. at 718. (“In the very same section of
ERISA as § 502(a)(3), Congress authorized ‘a participant or beneficiary’ to
bring a civil action ‘to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,’ without
reference to whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”). Thus, under
§ [502](a)(1)(B), when determining what rights a Plan participant has in a
recovery, any and all relief available is appropriate. Clearly, in the present
case, Yerby is a Plan beneficiary and United is the Plan fiduciary. Under ER-
ISA, § [502](a)(3) will not allow for United to bring suit in a federal court and
obtain anything other than equitable relief. The Supreme Court, however, ex-
pressly left open the question of whether a Plan fiduciary (United) may re-
ceive other forms of relief when a Plan beneficiary (Yerby) brings suit under
§ [502](a)(1)(B) to enforce or clarify his or her rights under the Plan. To write
in a restriction on the type of relief available under § [502](a)(1)(B), which is
exactly what would occur if this Court agreed with Yerby, would be an “at-
tempt to adjust the ‘carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme’ em-
bodied in the text that Congress has adopted.” If the Supreme Court of the
United States refuses to do this, it is not the place of this Court to do so. Thus,
Yerby’s argument that only equitable relief is available is unfounded.”183
Copeland Enterprises and Yerby represent the most clearly rea-
soned opinions among a mere handful of older state court decisions
involving intervention by a plan administrator.184  Although the plan
claim, filed in state court, by a plan administrator seeking to enforce the plan’s
right of reimbursement against a plan participant.  See Funk Mfg. Co., v. Frank-
lin, 927 P.2d 944, 949 (Kan. 1996).
181. 846 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 2002).
182. Id. at 180.
183. Id. at 186–87.
184. See, e.g., Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723; Faires v. Pageau, No.
CV 970403163S, 1999 WL 1001164 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 1999); Funk Mfg.
Co., 927 P.2d 944.
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in Yerby successfully opted to intervene in the participant’s state court
tort action, most plan administrators would prefer to litigate in fed-
eral court, before federal district court judges who are familiar with
ERISA civil remedies and the Supreme Court’s precedents regarding
plan benefit claims under section 502(a)(1)(B) and ERISA subrogation
claims under section 502(a)(3).
3. Injunctive or Declaratory Relief in Federal Court
In lieu of intervening directly in the participant’s state court ac-
tion, the plan administrator may seek injunctive or declaratory relief
in federal court regarding disbursement of the recovered funds in the
state court tort action.  The Federal Anti-Injunction Act (AIA)185
comes into play if the plan administrator takes this indirect approach.
The AIA provides, “a court of the United States may not grant an in-
junction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly au-
thorized by an Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”186  There are
two bodies of law that have developed under the AIA, one dealing with
actions seeking to enjoin a state court, the other dealing with actions
seeking a declaratory judgment that impacts a pending state court
action.
Injunctive Relief
Although the AIA generally prohibits the federal courts from issu-
ing injunctions to stay proceedings in state courts, the statute pro-
vides for three exceptions to this general rule.187  For purposes of
ERISA subrogation claims, the relevant exception is for injunctions
that are “expressly authorized” by federal statute.188  The test for
whether a federal statute expressly authorizes an injunction, as first
elaborated by the Supreme Court in Mitchum v. Foster,189 is whether
the statute, “clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a
federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the
stay of a state court proceeding.”190  If so, then an injunction is “ex-
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012).
186. Id.
187. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286
(1970).
188. § 2283 (excepting injunctions: (1) expressly authorized by statute; (2) necessary
to aid the court’s jurisdiction; or (3) required to protect or effectuate the court’s
judgments); see Denny’s, Inc. v. Cake, 364 F.3d 521, 529 (4th Cir. 2004); see also
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 145–46 (1988) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 398 U.S. at 287–88 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283).
189. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
190. Id. at 238 (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the type of statutory scheme creating
a unique federal right or remedy that could be frustrated if the federal courts
were not permitted to enjoin state court proceedings).
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pressly authorized” by the statute.  Currently, the federal courts of ap-
peals are divided over whether injunctive relief related to an ERISA
subrogation claim is “expressly authorized” under the Mitchum v. Fos-
ter standard.191
The Second and Sixth Circuits hold that an injunction directed at
the distribution of a recovery from a state court tort action to preserve
the plan’s right to reimbursement is expressly authorized by ER-
ISA.192  As the Sixth Circuit explained in General Motors Corp. v.
Buha, “[i]t is central to the statutory scheme that ERISA not be sub-
ject to state and local laws which might frustrate its goals.”193  There-
fore, the court held:
ERISA meets both prongs of the Mitchum test.  When a district court finds
that an action in a state court will have the effect of making it impossible for a
fiduciary of a . . . plan to carry out its responsibilities under ERISA, the [Anti-
Injunction Act does] not prohibit it from enjoining the state court
proceedings.194
In contrast, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits hold
ERISA does not expressly authorize injunctions of state court proceed-
ings.  As a result, in these jurisdictions the AIA will bar an attempt by
the plan administrator to enjoin the distribution of a recovery from a
state court tort action to preserve the plan’s right to reimburse-
191. Compare Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 329 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding fiduciary with respect to the plan is authorized under ERISA to seek an
injunction of the state proceedings), and Gen. Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d
455, 459 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding the injunction of state court proceedings is not
barred by the Anti-Injunction Act because the state court action would make it
impossible for fiduciary to carry out its responsibilities under ERISA), with Trs.
of Carpenters’ Health & Welfare v. Darr, 694 F.3d 803, 807–08 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding ERISA § 502(a)(3)(A) does not expressly authorize injunctions against
state courts), Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4th Cir.
1995) (ruling ERISA does not fall within the expressly authorized exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act), 1975 Salaried Ret. Plan for Eligible Emps. of Crucible,
Inc. v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 410 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding ERISA does not ex-
pressly authorize “injunctions of state court actions simply because they are pre-
empted by ERISA”), Total Plan Servs., Inc. v. Texas Retailers Ass’n, Inc., 925
F.2d 142, 144–46 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding ERISA does not fall within the “ex-
pressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act), and U.S. Steel Corp.
Plan for Emp. Ins. Benefits v. Musisko, 885 F.2d 1170, 1178 (3d Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing ERISA does not expressly authorize an injunction of preempted state
proceedings).
192. Gilbert, 765 F.2d at 329; Buha, 623 F.2d at 459.
193. Buha, 623 F.2d at 459.
194. Id.
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ment.195  The Third Circuit’s reasoning in United States Steel Corp.
Plan for Employee Insurance Benefits v. Musisko196 is typical:
[n]owhere in the comprehensive legislative record [of ERISA] is there any in-
dication that Congress intended to authorize injunctions against state courts.
Indeed, the very act of delegating concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts
for resolution of beneficiaries’ claims is evidence of Congress’ satisfaction that
state tribunals would fairly and competently adjudicate such cases.197
The Musisko court further reasoned that a federal court is not permit-
ted to enjoin state court proceedings just because the state proceed-
ings “ ‘invade an area pre-empted by federal law even when the
interference is unmistakably clear . . . .  The fact that the state pro-
ceeding presents a preemption issue does not alter the respect due the
state tribunal.  ‘[T]he proper course is to seek resolution of that issue
by the state court.’”198
The line of reasoning illustrated by Musisko is fundamentally
flawed in two respects.  First, Congress’s decision to grant the federal
district courts exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over claims to en-
force the terms of a plan under ERISA section 502(e)(1)199 strongly
indicates that Congress did not intend for state tribunals to decide
ERISA subrogation claims.  Second, because state courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction to hear a plan administrator’s claim under ERISA
section 502(a)(3) to enforce the terms of the plan’s reimbursement
clause, it may be futile to “seek resolution of that issue” by attempting
to intervene in the state court action.200  Unless the state court is will-
ing to characterize the participant’s claim in the state court tort action
as one to determine plan benefits under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)
(the analysis adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Yerby201),
it is simply impossible for the ERISA subrogation issue to be resolved
by the state court.202
The Seventh Circuit in Trustees of the Carpenters’ Health & Wel-
fare Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Darr,203 while holding as a general rule
that ERISA does not expressly authorize injunctive relief as an excep-
195. Darr, 694 F.3d at 807–08; Shannon, 65 F.3d at 1132; Total Plan Servs., Inc., 925
F.2d at 144–46; Musisko, 885 F.2d at 1178; see also Nobers, 968 F.2d at 410 (fol-
lowing Musisko); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Walsh, Knippen,
Pollock & Cetina, Chartered, No. 15 C 7143, 2015 WL 7077334 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13,
2015) (following Darr).
196.  885 F.2d 1170.
197. Id. at 1177.
198. Id. at 1177–78 (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149–50
(1988)) (internal citations omitted).
199. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2012).
200. See discussion supra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.
201. See discussion supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
202. See § 1132(e)(1) (granting the federal district courts exclusive subject matter ju-
risdiction over section 502(a)(3) claims).
203. 694 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012).
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tion to the AIA,204 appeared to at least recognize this problem of ex-
clusively federal subject matter jurisdiction.  The Darr Court posited
that ERISA may expressly authorize an injunction against a state
court if the state court lawsuit “will have the effect of making it impos-
sible for a fiduciary of a[n ERISA] plan to carry out its responsibilities
under ERISA.”205  The “impossible responsibility” in the ERISA sub-
rogation claim context is collecting reimbursement, as required by the
terms of the plan, from a participant who has every incentive after
Montanile to thwart repayment by spending the funds.
Declaratory Judgments
In jurisdictions where the federal courts refuse to apply the “ex-
pressly authorized” exception for injunctive relief, the plan adminis-
trator may attempt to bring a declaratory judgment action in federal
court as a means of effectively dictating the distribution of the recov-
ered funds in the participant’s state court tort action.  As a general
rule, the federal courts have taken the view outside of the ERISA con-
text that where the AIA bars an injunction, it also bars declaratory
judgments that would have the same effect as an injunction.206  This
interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Samuels v. Mackell.207  In Samuels, the criminal defendants sought
an injunction and a declaratory judgment in federal court against
their state criminal prosecutions.208  Although not explicitly discuss-
ing the AIA, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should be judged by essen-
tially the same standards.  In both situations deeply rooted and long-settled
principles of equity have narrowly restricted the scope for federal interven-
tion, and ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same
interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding
policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.209
Based on this reasoning, the Samuels Court concluded that where an
injunction is impermissible, declaratory relief should be barred as
204. See id. at 807–08.
205. Id. at 808 (quoting Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4th
Cir 1995)) (emphasis omitted).  Although the state court lawsuit in Darr would
have required the plan to pay a portion of an attorney’s fees in violation of plan
terms, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plan administrator could still carry
out its duties under ERISA.  See id.
206. See Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes v. First Bank & Trust Co., 560 Fed. Appx. 699,
707 n.8 (10th Cir. 2014); Texas Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 506
(5th Cir. 1988); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 195 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975); see
also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (discussing how declaratory relief
would have virtually the same impact as an injunction).
207. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
208. Id. at 68.
209. Id. at 72.
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well.210  Despite Samuels, the law in the lower courts is far less clear,
and no federal appellate court appears to have addressed the issue of
whether a declaratory judgment in federal district court can be used
as an alternative to seeking injunctive relief in those jurisdictions that
do not recognize an ERISA subrogation claim as an exception to the
AIA.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Denny’s Inc. v. Cake211 illustrates
how some circuits have approached the declaratory judgment-in-lieu-
of an injunction issue.  In Denny’s, the Fourth Circuit relied on Samu-
els v. Mackell and held the Anti-Injunction Act bars the plan adminis-
trator from asserting a declaratory judgment claim if it would have
the same effect as an injunction.212  The employer in Denny’s had
sought both a declaratory judgment, requesting the court to declare
that ERISA preempted state law claims that its vacation pay plan vio-
lated South Carolina state law, and an injunction, seeking to enjoin
the application of state law to the employer’s vacation pay plan.213
The Fourth Circuit determined that the employer’s request for a de-
claratory judgment had the same effect as its request for an injunc-
tion.214 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit ordered the complaint filed
by the employer in federal district court to be dismissed on the ground
that the AIA barred both requests for an injunction and declaratory
relief.215
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Prudential Life Insurance Co. of
America v. Doe216 held the AIA did not bar declaratory relief sought in
federal court by an insurance company, who sought to limit the
210. Id.  Although the Supreme Court limited its holding to cases where the state
criminal prosecution had begun prior to the federal suit, other federal courts cite
Samuels as support for barring a declaratory judgment action under the Anti-
Injunction Act.
211. 364 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2004).
212. See id. at 528 n.8. (quoting Texas Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 506
(5th Cir. 1988)).  This principle that a party cannot use a declaratory judgment as
an end-run around the Anti-Injunction Act is consistent with other areas of pro-
cedure.  For instance, in International Association of Entrepreneurs of America v.
Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266 (8th Cir. 1995), the defendant was untimely in attempting
to remove a state court action and then subsequently brought a declaratory judg-
ment action in federal court. Id. at 1268.  The Eighth Circuit held that a declara-
tory judgment should not be used to circumvent the deadlines imposed by the
removal statute or as a “convenient and temporally unlimited back door into fed-
eral court.” Id. at 1270.
213. Denny’s, 364 F.3d at 523.
214. Id. at 528 n.8 (quoting Jackson, 826 F.2d at 506).
215. Denny’s, 364 F.3d at 531; see also Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d
1126, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding the Anti-Injunction Act barred both declara-
tory and injunctive relief); U.S. Steel Corp. Plan for Emp. Ins. Benefits v.
Musisko, 885 F.2d 1170, 1180 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding the district court erred in
granting an injunction and a declaratory judgment because both were barred by
the Anti-Injunction Act).
216. 140 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Doe II”).
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mental health benefits available under one of its insured group health
plans.217  In Prudential Life, the insurance company, acting in its ca-
pacity as the plan’s administrator, first filed a declaratory judgment
action in federal court regarding the mental health benefits due to the
participant under the terms of the plan.218  The participant then filed
an action against the insurance company in Illinois state court alleg-
ing numerous state law claims.219  After the participant filed the state
court action, the insurance company filed a second amended and re-
stated complaint in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that
the participant’s claims in state court were preempted by ERISA and
were mandatory counterclaims in the employer’s federal district court
action.220  Based on these procedural facts, the Eighth Circuit held
the AIA did not bar the insurance company’s claim for declaratory re-
lief.221  In reaching this holding, the Eighth Circuit found it signifi-
cant that the insurance company, who filed the ERISA-based claim for
declaratory relief in federal district court, was the first litigant to file
suit,222 and further noted that the federal district court had discretion
to determine whether to hear the declaratory judgment action.223
To summarize, the law (and thus the potential result) is simply
uncertain if a plan administrator seeks injunctive or declaratory relief
in federal court to control the disbursement of the funds in the state
court tort action.  Certainly, this technique may be an option for a
plan administrator in select jurisdictions.  But from a policy perspec-
tive, litigating over subject matter jurisdictional issues under the
Anti-Injunction Act as an end-around for the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Montanile seems unnecessarily complex and wasteful.  As the
above discussion makes clear, all of the players who are involved in
ERISA subrogation litigation—plan participants and their tort law-
yers, plan administrators, and the federal and state courts—are ill-
served by the procedural complexity and uncertainty of the status quo.
4. Equitable Relief in Federal Court Under Section 502(a)(3)
The final option for the plan administrator who desires to enforce
the terms of a self-insured plan’s reimbursement clause is to file an
ERISA subrogation claim in federal district court under section
502(a)(3).  After four Supreme Court decisions, at least the federal
217. Id. at 787.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 788.
222. Id. at 788–89.
223. See id.; see also NSG Am., Inc. v. Jefferson, 218 F.3d 519, 523 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Doe, 76 F.3d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Doe I”)
and Doe II, 140 F.3d at 789, as examples of courts taking the abstention route to
thwart procedural fencing in the ERISA context).
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common law governing ERISA subrogation claims filed in federal
court is fairly clear.224  But to prevent the participant from dissipating
the funds recovered through state court tort litigation after Montanile,
the plan administrator must closely monitor the state court proceed-
ings, while simultaneously pursuing the plan’s reimbursement claim
in federal district court.  This system of bifurcated litigation is simply
wasteful for both the plan administrator and the state and federal
judiciary.
C. Conclusion:  An Arbitrary and Inefficient Enforcement
System
It is difficult to imagine that Congress intentionally created the
current system for plan reimbursement claims as part of a “carefully
crafted and detailed enforcement scheme.”225  The law of ERISA sub-
rogation claims has evolved over time through the process of federal
common law.226  Unfortunately, the result today is an arbitrary and
inefficient enforcement system for all of the interested stakeholders.
The current law of ERISA subrogation claims: (1) makes it more diffi-
cult for injured plan participants to obtain legal services on a contin-
gency fee basis; (2) requires the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar to
decline potentially meritorious cases or to avoid cooperation with the
client’s health care plan; (3) forces plan administrators to spend time
and plan assets navigating a virtual legal labyrinth in fulfillment of
their ERISA fiduciary duties; (4) increases the costs of voluntary plan
sponsorship for employers; and (5) wastes valuable state and federal
judicial resources by bifurcating litigation into a state court tort action
and a federal court ERISA subrogation claim.
Although Congress’s most recent attempt to repeal the employer
mandate under the Affordable Care Act was not successful,227 the
need for reform in this highly technical, yet highly important, area of
the law remains.  As the costs of sponsoring a group health plan con-
tinue to rise, employers become increasingly incentivized to not offer
health insurance coverage to their workers and simply pay the tax
penalty imposed by the employer mandate.  Given the significant per-
centage of the workforce that obtains health insurance coverage
through an employer’s self-insured group health plan,228 national
health care policy should emphasize reforms that minimize, to the ex-
tent possible, the costs to employers of voluntarily sponsoring and ad-
224. See discussion supra section II.B.
225. Great-West Life & Ann. Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (quoting
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–47 (1985))).
226. See discussion supra section II.B.
227. See discussion supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
228. See discussion supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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ministering group health plans.  By enacting the targeted statutory
amendment proposed in Part IV of the Article, Congress can resolve
(or at least mitigate) the problems with the current enforcement sys-
tem for plan reimbursement clauses, and thereby lend support to em-
ployers who voluntarily sponsor self-insured group health plans.
IV. A TARGETED STATUTORY AMENDMENT SOLUTION
Numerous scholars over the years have criticized the law of ERISA
subrogation claims.229  Employers who sponsor self-insured health
care plans and insurance industry representatives who provide plan
administrative services for self-insured plans have argued in books,
articles, and Supreme Court amicus briefs that strict enforcement of
reimbursement clauses is necessary to contain the costs of the spon-
soring the health care plan for the employer.230  Assuming one accepts
the premise that recoupments from ERISA subrogation litigation re-
229. See Scott M. Aronson, ERISA’s Equitable Illusion: The Unjust Justice of Section
502(a)(3), 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 247 (2005); Baron & Lamb, supra note 43;
Connery, supra note 136; Ertel, supra note 137; Gerth & Graham, supra note
131; Huffaker, supra note 139; David M. Kono, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA
Health Insurer Pockets—A Vote for National Federal Common Law Adoption of
the Make Whole Doctrine, 2000 B.Y.U.  L. REV. 427 (2000); Lipschultz, supra note
163; Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform,
63 AM. U. L. REV. 649 (2014); Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Under-
standing and Problematizing Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L. J.
49 (2008); Percy, supra note 171; Dennis J. Wiley, Enforcing Recoupment Provi-
sions After Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson: A Sug-
gested Method of Analysis for Reviewing Courts, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
1195 (2006).
230. Brief for Respondent at 46, Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus.
Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016) (No. 14-723); Brief of Amici Curiae
IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health & Benefit Fund and the Chamber of Com-
merce of the U.S.A. Supporting Respondent at 7, Montanile, 136 S. Ct. 651 (No.
14-723); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 22, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S.
Ct. 1537 (2013) (No. 11-1285); Brief of Amici Curiae the Blue Cross Blue Shield
Association and the Rawlings Company, LLC in Support of Petitioner at 7, Mc-
Cutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (No. 11-1285); Brief Amici Curiae for the National Asso-
ciation of Subrogation Professionals and the Self Insurance Institute of America,
Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 23, McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (No. 11-1285);
Brief Amici Curiae for the Society for Human Resource Management the Cham-
ber of Commerce of the U.S.A in Support of Respondent at 15, Sereboff v. Mid.
Atl. Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356 (2006) (No. 05-260); Motion of the American Asso-
ciation of Health Plans, the American Benefits Council, the Blue Cross Blue
Shield Association, the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., and the Health Insur-
ance Association of America for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief of
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10, n.20, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins.
Co., 534 U.S. 204 (2000) (No. 99-1786); See Thomas H. Lawrence & John M. Rus-
sell, ERISA Subrogation 3 (ABA 2000); Mark A Hofmann, Health Plan Wins
Fight Over Costs Recovery: Ruling Benefits Employers, BUS. INS., May 22, 2006,
at 27 (quoting an industry representative as asserting that “reimbursements are
vital to the ability of health plans to try to keep up with rising health-care costs”).
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duce the costs of plan sponsorship,231 then one must also acknowledge
that this advantage to the plan’s sponsor is offset, perhaps signifi-
cantly, by the costs of collection through the current cumbersome and
inefficient monitoring and litigation process.  Notwithstanding its re-
cent failed attempt at comprehensive national health care reform,232
Congress could address the problems identified by this Article with
the current state of ERISA subrogation claims after Montanile.
Prior to the enactment of the ACA, between 1996 and 2008 Con-
gress successfully enacted a series of bipartisan ERISA health care
policy reforms using targeted statutory amendments to address nar-
row, but nevertheless important, issues in national health care pol-
icy.233  More recently, a bipartisan Congress acting in cooperation
with President Obama successfully used this targeted statutory
amendment approach to address and resolve narrow, but nevertheless
important, issues under the ACA by enacting the Protecting Afforda-
ble Coverage for Employees Act234 and the 21st Century Cures Act.235
We propose a similar approach to fix the problems with ERISA subro-
gation claims.  Our targeted statutory amendment solution, presented
231. Baron and Lamb have argued that subrogated recoveries do not directly benefit
the participants in a self-insured plan, but rather represent a windfall recovery to
the plan’s sponsoring employer, who uses the recovery to lower employer contri-
butions for future years. See Baron & Lamb, supra note 43, at 333.  Although
Baron and Lamb tender this point as a criticism of reimbursement clause en-
forcement, it also supports ERISA’s secondary policy purpose of encouraging em-
ployers to voluntarily sponsor employee benefit plans by reducing administrative
costs. See discussion supra note 41 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
233. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 101, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939; Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 601, 110 Stat. 2935, 2935; Women’s Health and
Cancer Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 901, 112 Stat. 2681-436, 2681-
436; Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
§ 101, 122 Stat. 881, 883; Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Par-
ity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 511, 122 Stat. 3765,
3881.
234. Protecting Affordable Coverage for Employees Act, Pub. L. No. 114-60, 129 Stat.
543 (2015) (PACE Act).  The PACE Act amended section 1304(b) of the Affordable
Care Act and section 2791(e) of the Public Health Service Act to revise the defini-
tion of a “small employer”  for purposes of the market reforms under title I of the
Affordable Care Act and title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act. Id. The
PACE Act generally defined a small employer as an employer who employed an
average of 1–50 employees on business days during the preceding calendar year,
but provided the states the option of extending the definition of small employer to
include employers with up to 100 employees.
235. Pub. L. No.  114-255, § 18001, ___ Stat. ___ (2016) (Cures Act).  The Cures Act
created an exception to the group health plan requirements of the Affordable
Care Act by permitting small employers who are not subject to the employer
mandate to offer qualified small health reimbursement arrangements for full-
time workers that reimburse up to $4,950 per individual or $10,000 per family for
medical expenses or individual health insurance policy premiums.
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in detail below, is intended to address two overarching concerns.
First, the proposed amendment would address the arbitrary and un-
certain nature of the net tort recovery for an injured plan participant
by requiring the federal courts to apply the common-fund doctrine
when awarding “appropriate equitable relief” for ERISA subrogation
claims brought under section 502(a)(3).  The proposed amendment ef-
fectively would repeal the Supreme Court’s decision in McCutchen236
and render plan terms to the contrary void as a matter of public policy.
Second, the proposed amendment would streamline the reimburse-
ment clause enforcement process by giving state courts concurrent ju-
risdiction over ERISA subrogation claims.  In addition, the proposed
amendment would prohibit removal of such claims to the federal
courts.  This requirement would permit ERISA subrogation claims to
be adjudicated in the state court forum where the participant’s under-
lying tort action is filed, rather than bifurcating the tort–ERISA sub-
rogation litigation into a state court tort action and a federal court
claim to enforce the plan’s reimbursement clause.
A. The Proposed Amendment
Section 502(g) of ERISA237 governs the awarding of attorneys’ fees
and costs in civil actions filed under section 502.  Our proposed
amendment would add the following new subsection (3) to section
502(g):
(3) (i)  In any action under subsection 502(a)(3) of this
title by a fiduciary for or on behalf of a plan seeking
appropriate equitable relief against a plan participant
or beneficiary to enforce the terms of a reimbursement
clause in a non-insured group health plan, the court
shall apply the common fund doctrine to equitably allo-
cate attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses between the
plan and the participant or beneficiary.
(ii)  Definitions.
(a) The term “group health plan” shall have the
meaning defined in section 607(1).
(b) The term “reimbursement clause” shall mean a
group health plan term providing that if the plan
advances or pays the medical expenses of or oth-
erwise provides plan benefits to a plan partici-
236. See discussion supra subsection II.B.3.
237. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2012).
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pant or beneficiary for injuries caused by a third
party, and the plan participant or beneficiary
later covers any damages or other compensation
from such third party by award, judgment, set-
tlement or otherwise, then the plan participant
or beneficiary shall reimburse the plan in full for
the benefits advanced, paid, or otherwise pro-
vided by the group health plan.
(c) The term “non-insured group health plan” shall
mean a group health plan that is not subject to
the law of any State that regulates insurance by
virtue of the application of section 514(b)(2)(B) of
this title.
In addition, section 410 of ERISA238 would be amended by adding
the following new subsection (c):
(c) Any reimbursement clause (as defined in subsection
502(g)(ii)(b))  in a non-insured group health plan (as de-
fined in subsection 502(g)(3)(ii)(c)) that purports to re-
quire a plan participant or beneficiary to reimburse the
plan without reduction for attorney’s fees, costs, or ex-
penses, or otherwise purports to waive the application
of the common fund doctrine in an action under section
502(a)(3) seeking appropriate equitable relief to enforce
the terms of the reimbursement clause against the par-
ticipant or beneficiary shall be void as against public
policy.
Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1445,239 governing nonremovable actions,
would be amended to add the following new subsection (e):
(e) A civil action in any State court arising under sec-
tion 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 by a fiduciary for or on behalf of a
plan seeking appropriate equitable relief against a plan
participant or beneficiary  to enforce the terms of a re-
imbursement clause in a non-insured group health plan
(as such terms are defined in subsection 502(g) (3)(ii))
238. § 1110.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (2012) (section 1445).  Currently, section 1445 makes nonremov-
able to the federal district courts only four specific types of civil actions filed in
the state courts.  Our proposal would add a fifth. Id.
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may not be removed to any district court of the United
States.
B. Policy Analysis of the Amendment
The amendment rejects as politically impracticable the Supreme
Court’s suggestion in Montanile that section 502(a)(3) of ERISA be
amended so that actions to enforce plan terms are not limited to equi-
table relief.240  This suggestion does nothing to address the arbitrary
and uncertain nature of the net tort recovery for an injured plan par-
ticipant or the disincentives to the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar to
provide legal services to injured plan participants.  As the Supreme
Court stated in McCutchen, “[t]hird-party recoveries do not often come
free: [t]o get one, an insured must incur lawyer’s fees and expenses.
Without cost-sharing, the insurer free rides on its beneficiary’s ef-
forts—taking the fruits while contributing nothing to the labor.”241
Our proposed amendment retains “appropriate equitable relief” as
the proper remedy consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior prece-
dents, but makes targeted modifications to the statute so that ERISA
subrogation litigation is more fair to injured plan participants, encour-
ages personal injury attorneys to provide legal services to injured plan
participants on a contingency-fee basis, and makes the procedure for
enforcing a plan reimbursement clause more efficient for self-insured
group health plans by locating the plan’s ERISA subrogation claim in
the same forum—usually a state court—as the participant’s underly-
ing personal injury action.
We anticipate at least two objections to our proposed amendment,
but find both objections not compelling in light of the advantages
gained by changing the status quot.  First, if Congress adopts this
statutory change, the result will be that state court judges (not the
federal judiciary) primarily will be ruling on ERISA plan subrogation
claims and applying the common-fund doctrine.242  The competence of
the state judiciary to rule on these issues should not be in question.
Equitable claims for subrogation and the equitable apportionment of
attorneys’ fees are rooted firmly in the common law and are a garden-
variety matter for the state courts, as the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged in McCutchen.243 If the Supreme Court views its state court
240. See Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S.
Ct. 651, 661 (2016).
241. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1550 (2013).
242. If federal subject matter jurisdiction exists such that the participant files to re-
cover for personal injuries in federal district court, then the federal district court
would also hear any potential claim for reimbursement by the plan.
243. See McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1550 & n.8 (describing application of the common-
fund doctrine in subrogation litigation as a “strong and uniform” common law
rule).
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brethren as highly well-qualified to decide these issues, objections to
the contrary simply are not persuasive.
With the competency of the state court judiciary not in question,
we anticipate that the major argument against our proposed amend-
ment boils down to legislative policy, namely, that one of the core pur-
poses of ERISA was to ensure uniformity of plan administration, and
subjecting ERISA plans to interpretation by state court judges will
lead to a lack of uniformity, particularly for plans that cover partici-
pants in multiple states.244  In response, we would be hard-pressed to
improve upon the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Wurtz v. Rawl-
ings Co., LLC,245 which rejected a similar argument:
ERISA has strong preemptive provisions, the purpose of which are to provide
a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.  But ERISA says
nothing about subrogation provisions.  ERISA neither requires a welfare plan
to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such clauses or otherwise regu-
late their content.  Because ERISA is silent on subrogation, our decision does
nothing to disturb ERISA’s goal of national uniformity in employee benefit
plan regulation.246
Under our proposed targeted amendment, state court judges (who al-
ready have concurrent jurisdiction to hear claims for denied plan ben-
efits247) will also interpret plan terms regarding a participant’s
reimbursement obligation.
With or without the Affordable Care Act as the law of the land, the
need for reform in this highly technical area of the law remains.  Na-
tional health care policy should emphasize reforms that minimize, to
the extent possible, the administrative costs to employers of volunta-
rily sponsoring and administering group health plans.  The targeted
statutory amendment proposed by the Article is a modest step to-
wards achieving this important public policy objective.
244. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64–65 (1990).
245. 761 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1400 (2015) (rejecting
argument that allowing plan participants’ claims under a state anti-subrogation
law to proceed is contrary to ERISA’s goal of ensuring national uniformity in the
administration of ERISA plans).
246. Id. at 244–45 (quotations and citations omitted).
247. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2012).
